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ABSTRACT 
 
Strategically Integrating Human Dimensions into Marine Conservation Decision-Making 
 
by 
 
Rebecca Jean Twohey 
 
There is a broad perception that many of the greatest knowledge gaps in marine 
conservation are in understanding and integrating human dimensions. Marine governance 
must go beyond the rhetoric that conservation will benefit from including human 
dimensions, and dig deeper into social science disciplines to find specific tools that may be 
useful. Bennett et al. (2017) advocate for “fostering knowledge on the scope and 
contributions of the social sciences to conservation” from the inception of conservation 
projects, during all stages of planning and implementation and at all scales, and encourage 
the mainstreaming of social science into conservation. However, the fractured nature of 
literature pointing to the importance of social science has left many unsure what is really 
important or what to do. This dissertation seeks to remedy this, first by mainstreaming how 
to strategically consider social equity, and second by learning from collective action studies.  
Social equity is increasingly included in conservation mission statements – either 
because it is an intrinsic goal or because it is believed to have functional value to help reach 
other objectives. Until now, social equity has been vaguely defined, and therefore been 
difficult to include, monitor and evaluate in environmental governance. Chapter 1 presents a 
theoretical foundation for defining and distinguishing between different types of social 
equity and considering social equity’s role in conservation outcomes. First, we introduce the 
  ix 
equity landscape as a way to describe the distributions of resources and participation rights 
in a society supported by social norms in a given community. We use case studies to 
illustrate how environmental management can benefit from considering the equity landscape 
in both short- and long-term strategy. Through collaborative efforts, we also describe social 
equity to include several dimensions – including participation (or input to conservation 
interventions), and spatial, access, and financial outcomes of a conservation intervention 
(Klein et al. 2015).  Chapter 1 motivates collecting empirical evidence of how different 
types of equity are experienced in a community and their influence on stakeholder behavior.  
Therefore, in Chapter 2 we investigate how fishers perceive and experience these 
different dimensions of equity, and how different dimensions of equity influence fisher 
compliance with social norms and willingness to punish defectors. Our interdisciplinary 
approach combines a behavioral experiment and surveys, and informs important decisions 
on critical design elements, such as should the intervention focus on participation, or 
outcomes of the intervention, such as access or financial benefits? Should equity objectives 
be equal or fair? And, how should managers measure these objectives? This research 
provides important empirical insight on how equity and conservation outcomes are 
interlinked and how management actions may influence stakeholder cooperation, thus 
presenting a unique insight into equity that is applicable to a wide range of settings.  
Second, this dissertation highlights the potential benefits of integrating collective 
action literature in fisheries management. Most problems in fisheries management are 
rooted in some sort of tragedy of the commons. Understanding the conditions under which 
cooperation can emerge and how to create policies around those conditions is extremely 
important for successful fisheries governance. The collective action literature contains a 
  x 
wealth of knowledge on how diverse types of societies can solve cooperation problems and 
real-world management questions.  
Chapter 3 investigates two such applied questions: Do self-assembled or randomly 
assigned groups cooperate better? And, if there are costs to random assignment, what 
strategies might help offset some of these costs? We show that self-assembly and the ability 
to communicate face-to-face both increase compliance with rules and punishment of 
defectors, although self-assembly has a greater effect.  
This work is specific to artisanal fishing communities in Tañon Strait, Philippines, 
but provides an approach to solving questions managers have to make on a range of key 
issues that likely have big consequences on conservation outcomes. By combining 
interdisciplinary theory and methods, my dissertation highlights how social science can both 
integrate into and aid conservation efforts.   
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Summary 
Social equity is increasingly considered in environmental management plans, both 
for intrinsic and functional reasons. Here, we argue that equity plays an important strategic 
role in the success and failure of both short- and long-term environmental initiatives. A 
society’s ‘equity landscape’—its norms about, and distributions of, costs and benefits 
associated with resources and participation rights in decision making— may have strong 
inertia thereby influencing what types of management can be implemented. Thus, improving 
social equity may come at a short-term conservation cost, but can have compounding 
benefits over time. Environmental management will be most effective at achieving its 
environmental, economic, and social objectives when it strategically considers both the 
current equity landscape and its potential for change. We highlight how local equity, and the 
norms surrounding it, influence short- and long-term outcomes.  
 
Introduction 
Equity is increasingly recognized as an environmental management goal (FAO 
2015), yet improvement in conservation outcomes has often not been coupled with 
improvement in socially equitable outcomes (Abreu et al. 2017). This raises the question: 
why not? One reason may be that equity is often considered in subjective and normative 
terms, often from an ethical, rather than a strategic, perspective, which belie its strategic 
importance. Compared to other aspects of conservation, little is known about its role in 
conservation success (Loomis and Ditton 1993; Miller et al. 2011; Halpern et al. 2013).  
Local historical, political, and economic contexts matter in pursuing management 
objectives (Klein et al. 2015). These contexts create what we call an ‘equity landscape’—a 
set of local norms that affect distributions of costs and benefits and participation rights in 
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environmental management across class, gender, ethnicity, wealth and other social 
dimensions. The equity landscape characterizes the current distributions of resources and 
participation rights in a society supported by social norms. These factors influence what 
types of management are implementable in a society at a given time (Halpern et al. 2013; 
Morales and Harris 2014) by shaping the willingness and ability of local stakeholders and 
power brokers to participate in implementing new resource management plans (Brooks et al. 
2013). For example, an equity landscape may promote equal access to a resource, such as in 
a publically managed forest, or it may support unequal access based on family lineage—
such as in marine tenure systems (Ruddle et al. 1992). The social norms that shape an equity 
landscape may be subtle, yet it is only through explicitly recognizing these norms that an 
equity landscape can be understood (Morales and Harris 2014) and possibly challenged in 
order to benefit environmental management.  
Here, we use case studies to illustrate how environmental management can benefit 
from considering the equity landscape in short- and long-term strategy (summarized in Box 
1). Management plans that conform to the existing equity landscape tend to be easier to 
implement in the short term, which can create short-term tradeoffs between equity and other 
objectives (Halpern et al. 2013; Klein et al. 2015). In the long term however, any costs or 
benefits to management objectives of changing the equity landscape will compound, as 
changes in the equity landscape change what types of management will be most easily 
implemented in the future. 
  4 
Box 1 
Social equity in environmental management strategy:  
Three considerations and examples 
1. What are the current equity norms 
and distributions of wealth, access, 
and power, and how do they affect 
what types of management work? 
Recognizing the market power of large international buyers of 
Brazilian soybean products, Greenpeace mounted successful 
campaigns targeting McDonald’s and Cargill to combat 
deforestation in the Amazon, instead of working with local 
farmers (Tercek and Adams 2013).  
2. How strong are the tradeoffs 
between pursuing short-term 
management objectives and 
maintaining the equity landscape? 
Stakeholder participation in the design of the marine protected 
area network under the California Marine Life Protection Act 
(CMLPA) was critical to its successful implementation 
(Weible, Sabatier and Lubell 2004), but stakeholder-proposed 
networks tend to be economically and ecologically inefficient, 
absent scientific guidance (Rassweiler et al. 2014).  
3. What are the long-term 
consequences of changing the 
equity landscape?  
Increasing women’s participation in African forest management 
may promote better long-term ecological and economic 
outcomes (Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997). In contrast, subsides 
to corn ethanol biofuels in the United States have created 
powerful lobbies that can hinder development of new 
alternative fuels, which may be more carbon-efficient 
(Fargione et al. 2008).    
 
Short-term compromise  
A society’s equity landscape strongly influences what types of management can be 
implemented due to inertia—meaning equity landscapes tend to be self-reinforcing. Equity 
landscapes tend to reinforce themselves because communities are slow to adopt change 
(Castro and Batel 2006), especially when it involves the social norms and individual 
preferences associated with costs and benefits (Manfredo et al. 2017, Minato 2010). 
Moreover, changing the power structure of a community can meet resistance from current 
power brokers (Valente et al. 2015). The process by which people consciously and 
unconsciously draw on existing social and cultural arrangements to shape institutions in 
response to changing situations is known as ‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 2001).  
Management plans working within the existing equity landscape by conforming to 
current and familiar distributions of resources, access, and power, may face less 
sociopolitical resistance, thus expediting resource management actions in the short term. 
There may be incentive to change the equity landscape if conforming to it comes at a cost to 
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achieving other objectives. When the current equity landscape poses challenges to the 
management objectives (which may include equity itself), compromise is key to balancing 
ideal outcomes with implementability. A plan that is implemented and achieves sub-optimal 
results may be better than a theoretically optimal plan that is never realized. The following 
examples illustrate such tradeoffs and compromise. 
 
Public works projects 
The locations and outcomes of public works projects, like renewable energy 
development and waste disposal sites, are often determined by a handful of people who do 
not reflect the will of the majority, but who have decision-making power. For example, 
renewable energy infrastructure projects have broad public support but have difficulty 
actually being implemented (Bell et al. 2005). In the UK, public opinion pools indicate the 
majority of people support wind power, but wind-power development projects are often 
blocked by a minority of decision makers who oppose it (Toke 2002). Similarly, in the 
United States when inactive hazardous waste disposal sites are both designated and cleaned 
up, it is often the marginalized or disadvantaged stakeholders who disproportionately take 
on the cost (Zimmerman 1993). These two examples of public works projects are 
implemented (or not) relatively quickly because they are following the path of least 
sociopolitical resistance (or not) by going through the designated decision making processes 
catering to an elite minority, despite having highly unequal outcomes.  
 
California Marine Life Protection Act (CMLPA) 
The California Marine Life Protection Act of 1999 required the Department of Fish 
and Game (now called the Department of Fish and Wildlife) to develop and implement a 
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network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) along the California coast designed to increase 
the coherence and effectiveness of protecting the state's marine life, habitat, and ecosystems. 
MPAs are spatially explicit management tools that restrict the use and access areas of the 
ocean. The Department of Fish and Game failed twice to implement the Act. The first 
attempt caused public outrage because it involved only scientific experts and excluded input 
from affected stakeholders in the preliminary recommendations (Weible et al. 2004). The 
second attempt involved scientists and stakeholders, but was ultimately unsuccessful as well 
(Weible et al. 2004). The design and implementation of a network of MPAs was only 
possible when the Department of Fish and Game explicitly addressed participation equity 
and adopted a highly participatory process involving Stakeholder Working Groups (Weible 
et al. 2004). The CMLPA is regarded as a successful case study for participatory planning 
processes and program implementation (Weible 2006), yet it is likely sub-optimal from 
purely ecological or economic perspectives in the absent scientific guidance (Rassweiler et 
al. 2014). Thus, the CMLPA may provide an example of a management plan that navigated 
a tradeoff between implementability (associated with the equity landscape) and ability to 
meet other objectives. 
 
Greenpeace and Amazon deforestation 
In hopes of slowing deforestation from soybean agriculture in Brazil in the early 
2000s, Greenpeace targeted key multinational buyers, McDonald’s and Cargill, rather than 
working directly with small-scale farmers (Tercek & Adams 2013). As a result, Cargill 
placed a moratorium on buying soy grown on land deforested post-2006. Farmers had to 
comply—not necessarily to their benefit—in order to sell their produce (Tercek & Adams 
2013). The decision process and outcomes reinforced the existing unequal equity landscape, 
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at the potential cost of social equity objectives, such as financial equality, but it was 
implemented quickly and was successful in slowing deforestation (Tercek & Adams 2013).  
 
Compounding effects of change  
Alternatively, managers may choose to change the equity landscape to build—
though they occasionally diminish—important capacity for long-term resource management 
(Leisher et al. 2016). Inherent to changing the equity landscape is the challenge of  
“constituting, deploying, and normalizing” new power dynamics (Kesby 2005). Changing 
the equity landscape also affects what types of management are implementable in the future, 
the long-term tradeoffs between management objectives—including equity—will be 
fundamentally different than in the short term. An intervention that changes the equity 
landscape at a high short-term cost (in terms of failure, risk, time, capital investment, etc.) 
may be worthwhile in the long-term if the new equity landscape pays long-term dividends 
with respect to the management objectives (which may include aspects of equity itself). 
Conversely, management can sometimes change the equity landscape—usually 
inadvertently—in ways that diminish capacity for future management success. The 
following examples illustrate these points.  
 
Chilean bull-kelp (Durvillaea antartica) management 
An ill-considered change to the equity landscape can have long-term compounding 
costs. For example, the traditional management of bull kelp (Durvillaea antartica) in Chile 
was based on the allocation of informal access rights through a lottery system controlled by 
a complex web of traditional institutions that were shown to be successful in terms of equity 
and resilience (Gelcich et al. 2006). Its replacement by the ‘parcela’ co-management system 
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caused long lasting negative social, economic and ecological impacts. Weakening of the 
traditional institutions shifted power structures and exacerbates differences between 
members’ livelihoods and capabilities, which then negatively effects trust within the 
community and intensified conflict among users (Gelcich et al. 2006). The new system also 
has higher costs associated with decision-making, policy implementation, and permit 
applications, which makes fishers more vulnerable to disturbances and eliminates the 
incentives to maintain adaptive strategies (Gelcich et al. 2006).  
 
First-generation renewable energy technologies 
Many first-generation renewable energy technologies also provide examples of a 
management intervention inadvertently changing the equity landscape in a way that had 
adverse effects—in this case, on the future implementability of better, second-generation 
renewable energy technologies. Corn-ethanol biofuels, for instance, gained substantial 
government subsidies in the U.S., as one of the first biofuels (Sorda et al. 2010). These 
subsidies became the status quo (and thus part of the equity landscape) for U.S. corn 
growers who were already a powerful lobby group. Despite studies later finding that corn 
ethanol causes more carbon pollution than traditional fossil fuels, due to the amount of land 
required to grow the corn (Fargione et al. 2008), the public subsidies for corn ethanol as a 
‘clean energy’ source have not been scaled back (Fiscal Year 2015 Analytical Perspectives). 
 
Scottish in-shore fishery 
It should be cautioned that management actions seeking to change the equity 
landscape may exasperate the existing inequities they aim to quell, and consequently 
diminish capacity for management success. For example, in 2009 the Scottish government 
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implemented In-Shore Fisheries Groups (IFGs) in an attempt to “give commercial inshore 
fishermen a stronger voice in wider marine management developments” (IFG website). 
IFGs were intended to empower fishers, but have adverse effects because there is no 
acknowledgement of the difference between types of fishers, and fishers felt powerless, 
unknowledgeable, and uncomfortable in the “formal spaces” where the IFG meetings were 
held (Nightingale 2013). In a further attempt to empower diverse members, the Scottish 
Government eliminated funding the for the IFG coordinators in 2012, intending that the 
group be voluntarily led by fishers themselves, but those fishers who had been very active in 
the group were “totally disgusted” and saw this as a move to further disempower them 
(Nightingale 2013: 12). The resulting management actions were not well received by the 
fishers, and were thus less likely to succeed (Nightingale 2013). This example cautions that 
changes to the equity landscape must be carefully considered, and still reflect existing 
cultural assumptions and norms about how people expect to be treated and represented.  
 
Gender equality in African forest management 
Profound gender inequality is an aspect of many societies’ equity landscapes, and 
case studies overwhelmingly find that changing the equity landscape to increase women’s 
participation in environment management decision-making processes increases long-term 
management success (Leisher et al. 2016). Increasing gender equity also requires culturally 
appropriate changes to the equity landscape. A specific example comes from Rocheleau and 
Edmunds (Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997) who review cases in Africa where huge gender 
inequalities exist in participation and benefits of management of forest products. They 
describe resource management as characterized by “social and ecological diversity and 
complex webs of connection between various groups of people and the resource that sustain 
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them” (Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997). They show how changing the traditional tenure 
decision-making processes, spatial allocations, and social organizations to prioritize 
women’s access to forest resources, increases both a gender equal distribution of 
management rights and sustainable use of forest resources. Specifically, they list 
management actions that change the equity landscape that are culturally appropriate: (1) 
encourage the development of legal rights and administrative procedures that accommodate 
multiple uses and users, (2) a formal recognition of gathering as a valid land use, 
complementary involvement of men and women in the processing and marketing of 
particular products from particular land use systems, (3) a legal recognition of customary 
law, revised to restore a balance between men’s and women’s rights and responsibilities, or 
(4) procedural reforms to allow women’s organizations and other organization with a strong 
representation of women to participate in the formation and enforcement of code, and (5) 
project contracts that protect men’s and women’s rights and responsibilities in established, 
evolving or experimental land use practices (Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997). 
 
Conclusion 
Environmental management increasingly seeks triple bottom line objectives 
(including equity). As social dimensions gain traction in design and implementation of 
environmental management, attention must be given to the strategic importance of equity. 
Ignoring equity is no longer a luxury resource managers can afford, and “drawing attention 
to norms and subjecting them to scrutiny can make us aware of choices we are making every 
day of which we had previously been unaware” (Raymond and Weldon 2013, also see 
Morales and Harris 2014). Therefore, environmental management will be most effective at 
achieving its triple bottom line objectives when it strategically considers both the current 
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equity landscape and its potential for change (Box 1). Equity’s impacts on success are real, 
and considering the equity landscape can help improve efficiencies and rates of success.  
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Highlights 
• Social equity, economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness are often sought. 
• Social equity can be necessary for success, but can compromise other goals. 
• We enhance our understanding of the social equity-conservation success relationship. 
• The best conservation outcome is often achieved without perfect social equity. 
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Abstract 
Conservation actions generally benefit some groups more than others, and this 
inequity is thought to affect the probability of achieving conservation objectives. This has 
led to the common assumption that triple bottom line solutions – those that are effective, 
efficient, and equitable – are best and most likely to achieve each individual objective. 
Although this may be true, it has been little tested, and importantly lacks a conceptual 
foundation for understanding, predicting and evaluating how equity affects conservation 
outcomes. We describe types of equity relevant to conservation and explore how they may 
affect the probability of successfully achieving conservation outcomes. Depending on the 
equity type and context, the relationship between equity and conservation success varies. 
We find that the best conservation outcome is often achieved without perfect equity; 
highlighting the risk of ignoring the relationship between equity and success. We offer a 
conceptual foundation for better addressing this important issue in future research and 
application. 
 
Keywords 
Biodiversity, Benefits, Conservation planning, Costs, Environment, Equity, Triple bottom 
line 
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1. Introduction 
Social equity – the equitable distribution of costs or benefits between individuals or 
groups of people – is a highly sought after ideal in many aspects of society. Whether related 
to education, employment, or healthcare, equitable outcomes or opportunities can influence 
the creation, durability, and success of local, national, and international policies (Solar and 
Irwin, 2007). The conservation of biodiversity is no exception (Halpern et al., 2013). In 
contrast to health and education, however, relatively little work has been done to understand 
how, and in what cases, explicit consideration of equity influences effectiveness of a 
conservation plan or policy (henceforth ‘conservation intervention’, which can include, but 
is not limited to: protected area plans/policies, payments for ecosystem services 
plans/policies, etc.). Here we aim to enhance our understanding of the relationship between 
different types of social equity and success in biodiversity conservation interventions, with 
the goal of improving conservation outcomes. A rich body of literature exists on measuring 
the effectiveness of conservation interventions, and understanding factors affecting the 
probability of their success (Bottrill and Pressey, 2012; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014; Mascia 
et al., 2014). Success in conservation is broadly defined by achievement of stated goals, 
which vary according to different values and beliefs. For example, a successful protected 
area plan could be measured by ecological representation, biodiversity persistence, or 
economic impact (Parrish et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2010), whereas a successful conservation 
policy could be measured by improved strength of legislation governing the use of natural 
resources (Gleason et al., 2010) or community support (Russ and Alcala, 1999). Other 
conservation outcomes might be measured by changes in social, institutional or human 
capital (Bottrill and Pressey, 2012; Ban et al., 2013). Ultimately, the success of conservation 
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interventions is often evaluated on the basis of conservation benefit, social equity, and 
economic return, the three components to triple bottom line conservation outcomes (Halpern 
et al., 2013). Yet the feasibility of achieving such triple bottom line solutions, and the 
potential interactions and tradeoffs among the three components, remains largely untested. 
(Halpern et al., 2013). Yet found that social equity can compromise achieving efficient 
conservation outcomes, but highlighted the importance of further research focused on 
exploring how the relationship between social equity and conservation success might 
influence these trade-offs, in particular with respect to the many different types of equity. 
Here, we explore this relationship to provide insight to outstanding questions in 
conservation, including: Is probability of conservation success actually optimized when all 
three components are maximized? Or, does conservation success require approaches that 
deviate from the triple bottom line? 
Equity is increasingly recognized as a component of conservation success (Ban et 
al., 2013; Campese, 2009).  However, there are multiple types of equity (Fig. 1), and being 
clear about what type of equity is important and being measured is critical for understanding 
the relationship between conservation success and equity. Equity concerns can arise from 
both internal factors (e.g., composition of the project team), which tend to be within the 
control of the planning team, and external contextual factors (e.g., social, geographic or 
economic conditions of the planning region), which are generally beyond the control of the 
project. For example, the design of a stakeholder engagement strategy might consider equal 
participation of different groups in a consultation process designed to ensure representation 
from all affected stakeholders, an internal factor. Alternatively, the variation and spatial 
distribution of existing income levels in the planning region might determine which 
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populations or communities are affected by restrictions on resource use recommended by a 
conservation plan, an external contextual factor. While external factors can rarely be 
controlled, understanding, anticipating and managing their influence on the design and 
implementation of a conservation intervention is likely to increase its probability of success 
(Berkes, 2004; Solar and Irwin, 2007). Internal factors can be inputs into, and/or outcomes 
of, a conservation intervention, and can influence its success (Fig. 1). We believe that 
consideration of different types of equity improves the chance of achieving conservation 
success. 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Conservation success can be influenced by several different types of equity (described in b), both 
as an input into (e.g., participation by stakeholder groups) and/or an outcome of the conservation 
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intervention (e.g., access to natural resources by individuals or groups). Each type of equity can be 
influenced by a variety of socioeconomic and political context determinants. 
 
The focus of this manuscript is on how social equity, one of many potential 
conservation objectives and factors affecting conservation success, influences the 
probability a conservation intervention succeeds in meeting its stated goal. We acknowledge 
that cases exist where equity plays little to no role in conservation interventions and their 
success, for example when governments impose protected areas despite local protests 
(Brockington, 2004), but our emphasis here is on cases where equity matters. We identify 
different types of input and outcome equity and discuss their possible relationships with 
conservation success. Finally, we simulate how understanding these relationships can help 
us evaluate the feasibility of triple bottom line solutions, where social equity, environmental 
benefit, and economic return are maximized. 
 
2. Social equity in conservation 
A complex collection of social structures, economic systems, and policy frameworks 
determine the relevance of equity to conservation outcomes, and thus conservation success. 
These social determinants of conservation equity reflect the distribution of wealth, power, 
and access to resources within a society, and can in turn have different consequences for 
different types of conservation equity. We identified many types of conservation equity, and 
divided them into two main categories, input and outcome, that influence conservation 
success (Fig. 1), all of which can be influenced by socioeconomic and political context 
(described below in Section 2.1).   
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Several types of equity can be either input or outcome equity, or both, depending on 
the decision process and goals of the conservation action. The primary distinction is whether 
the type of equity is a dimension of the social context that influences the process of making 
a conservation decision, i.e., input equity, or is something affected by the conservation 
action, i.e., outcome equity. As such, potential metrics of these types of equity are often the 
same (Fig. 1b), but how they are used and interpreted will differ. Differences between input 
and outcome equity are further explained and illustrated below. 
 
2.1. Socioeconomic and political context 
Context variables encompass a broad set of structural, cultural, and functional 
aspects of a social system that exert a powerful formative influence on patterns of social 
stratification and, thus, influence conservation equity (Ostrom, 1990, Solar and Irwin, 
2007). Fully characterizing all components of context is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Context determinants are often beyond the control of a conservation intervention, 
representing external factors influencing conservation success, except when the goal of the 
intervention is to change existing governance structures or policies. We highlight context 
here because it influences equity and thus affects conservation success. Examples of 
determinants related to context affecting conservation success include governance, cultural 
and societal values, and social/economic/public policies (Fig. 1).  
 
2.2. Input equity 
The socioeconomic and political context within a planning region gives rise to 
different forms of social position and hierarchy within groups of individuals. Populations 
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can be stratified by socioeconomic position according to education, occupation, gender/age, 
race/ethnicity, generational, financial status and other factors (Fig. 1). In some cases, these 
different groups participate in the conservation intervention through a participatory process, 
and help guide decisions about what and where to protect; we classify this as a form of input 
equity. For example, a decision process that includes only men or only wealthy people 
would be inequitable for those two types of input equity, and this may ultimately affect the 
ability to achieve the conservation outcome. In particular, the existence and equitability of 
the participatory process can directly influence conservation success by slowing or stopping 
the decision process, where in extreme cases the lack of a participatory process is 
responsible for failure of the intervention (Gleason et al., 2010). In other cases, the 
participatory process can influence the outcome of the intervention (e.g., the size or location 
or regulations of a protected area plan), which can in turn indirectly influence conservation 
success. 
 
2.3. Outcome equity 
Outcome equity refers to the distribution of costs and benefits of the final outcome 
of the conservation intervention (e.g., a protected area plan) to different socio-economic 
groups and/or across space (Fig. 1).  For example, a protected area plan can 
disproportionately impact different socioeconomic groups, such as different industry sectors 
(Adams et al., 2010); occupation equity), by restricting access to a natural resource (access 
or spatial equity). In many cases input equity can influence outcome equity, as those 
involved in the decision process may design a conservation intervention that favors 
themselves and thus leads to outcome inequity, often for the same type of equity (e.g., if 
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men dominate the decision process, they may produce outcomes that produce greater 
benefits for men). Outcome equity can be independent of input equity when conservation 
interventions do not involve a participatory process. 
 
3. Equity and probability of conservation success 
Once the types of equity relevant to a conservation intervention have been identified, 
conservation success requires understanding how these types of equity affect the probability 
of success. Increased social equity is often assumed to improve the probability of 
conservation success (Brown, 2002; Halpern et al., 2013).  In some cases, this assumption 
may be true; for example, in the implementation of locally managed marine areas, where 
self enforcement of new regulations is more likely to occur when local people perceive the 
regulations as equitable (Hatcher et al., 2000). However, it is also likely that conservation 
will fail if vocal or powerful individuals or groups are not satisfied with the outcome, in 
other words, if the outcomes of conservation planning and actions do not match the (often 
inequitable) local context. The relationship between equity and probability of conservation 
success is presumed to be positive (Brown, 2002), yet is poorly understood, and further 
complicated when values and perceptions among and between different groups are taken 
into account too (Ravallion, 2014, Fig. 2). Recognizing the difference between absolute, 
relative and perceived is critical for objective setting and evaluation of intervention 
outcomes. Absolute equity refers to every participant experiencing the same, or equal, 
outcome. For example, regardless of size, every boat is allowed to catch the same number of 
fish (Fig. 2). Relative equity refers to participants experiencing a proportional outcome 
related to a stated variable, e.g., boats receiving fish catch in proportion to their boat size as 
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compared to other boats. Perceived equity is how those involved in the process perceive of 
their allotted outcome compared others, e.g., the size of fish catch relative to other fishers. 
 
Fig. 2. Equity influences conservation success in different ways, depending on how it is measured and 
perceived. Potential measures and perceptions are illustrated for access equity, where a management plan 
limits fishing access to different fisher groups (each with a different size boat). When measured in absolute 
terms (a), each group benefits equally, represented by catching the same number of fish; when measured in 
relative terms (b), the benefit is distributed proportionally to the size of the boat. (c) the group with the 
largest boat has a positive perception of the relative benefits, whereas groups with smaller boats have a 
negative perception. 
 
Here, we describe four general relationships that have been observed between equity 
and probability of conservation success (P(x); Fig. 3): (A) Linear, where P(x) increases 
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proportionally with increasing equity; (B) Asymptotic, where P(x) increases rapidly with 
initial increases in equity and then plateaus; (C) Humped, where P(x) rises initially and then 
drops off with higher levels of equity, and (D) Sigmoidal, where P(x) responds slowly at 
first to increases in equity and then rises quickly. For nonlinear shapes, the location of 
inflection points (i.e., change in slope) is likely connected to a contextual determinant, such 
as governance or cultural value. For each relationship, we describe it in the terms of 
individual types of equity and support it using empirical evidence, where possible. These 
four relationships are hypotheses; their frequency of occurrence and impact on overall 
conservation outcomes are still to be fully tested. We hope the conceptual foundation 
described here helps make such testing more rigorous. For any equity type, its relationship 
with conservation success will likely vary from case to case depending on how equity is 
considered in the process (as an input or an outcome), how equity is measured (as 
quantitative or qualitative values, e.g., dollars versus participation effort), and how equity is 
defined (as absolute, relative or perceived) (McClanahan et al., 2008) (Fig. 2).  
3.1. Linear 
Occupational and spatial equity are two of several types of equity that may relate 
linearly with conservation success (Fig. 3a).  For example, it seems reasonable to expect 
conservation plans that produce more equitable relative impact to each key occupational 
sector, would be more successful. In California, the Marine Life Protection Act Initiative is 
an example of a successful conservation plan that made considerable effort to equitably 
impact commercial fishery sectors in each major region (Klein et al. 2010, White et al. 
2013).   
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Fig. 3. Four broad classes of relationship between 
equity and the probability of conservation success, 
P(x): (a) Linear; (b) Asymptotic; (c) Humped; and (d) 
Sigmoidal. A value of 1 indicates perfect equity and 
conservation success. For each relationship, we do not 
know where they cross an axis (shown in (a)). If there 
is a minimum threshold of equity, below which there 
is zero chance of success, then the lines would cross 
the x-axis; whereas if success is possible in inequitable 
situations, the lines would intercept the y-axis. Photos 
represent equity types that can exhibit the associated 
relationship, occupational, participation, gender, and 
access, respectively. Photos courtesy of (a) Urlich 
Karlowski; (b) World Wildlife Fund, Inc. Tory Read; 
(c) Trond Larsen; (d) Cristina Mittermeier. 
 
 
With spatial equity, a linear relationship between equity and conservation success 
has been observed with a type of spatial fisheries management, Territorial User Rights in 
Fisheries (TURFs), which allow individuals or a set group of people to fish in a particular 
area. TURFs have demonstrated increasingly positive outcomes with increasing levels of 
both input and output equity. For example, Chilean TURF cooperatives allocate effort 
temporally and spatially via a pooling scheme (input equity), to equalize the work burden 
and spread effort in a more efficient manner (Cancino et al., 2007), and this program has 
successfully met conservation goals (by not exceeding the total allowable catch) and social 
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goals (by equally distributing the transaction costs and benefits of the TURF)—an example 
of output equity. 
 
3.2. Asymptotic 
Financial and participation equity are two of several types of equity that could relate 
to conservation success asymptotically (Fig. 3b), where conservation success increases with 
increasing levels of equity to a point, after which equity does not influence success. With 
financial equity, conservation success is assumed to increase with increasing financial equity 
(i.e., distribution between groups regardless of financial status or profitability). However, in 
some cases conservation success is likely to peak, and remain constant, when more powerful 
or vocal stakeholders receive the greatest benefit. For example, when the Great Barrier Reef 
was rezoned, the government provided monetary compensation to commercial fishermen 
but not to other, more profitable industries (Macintosh et al., 2010). As fishermen were the 
most vocal stakeholder group, allocation of additional money to other groups, an example of 
output equity, may not have impacted conservation success, resulting in an asymptotic 
relationship. 
Similarly to financial equity, the probability of success of conservation interventions 
could increase, to a point, with increasing participation from stakeholder groups 
(participation equity). An example of how stakeholder participation can lead to successful 
conservation was demonstrated using data from 84 forest management cases around the 
world (Persha et al., 2011); whereas, lack of stakeholder participation lead to an 
unsuccessful conservation was shown in the first attempt to implement the California's 
Marine Life Protection Act (Gleason et al, 2010). Similarly, in Alaska where all federal 
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fisheries are managed by annual catch limits and some type of limited access program, 
stakeholders and the public have several opportunities for participation input during the 
development phase, which is recognized as critical for building stakeholder acceptance of 
the program and balancing divergent interests (Fina, 2011). However, this relationship is 
unlikely to be linear, as conservation success likely stabilizes once the most vocal or 
influential stakeholders are included in the process (i.e., engaging additional, less influential 
stakeholders in the decision process might increase equity but likely have little effect on 
conservation success). 
3.3. Humped 
Generational, gender, social, ethnicity, and financial (described above) are types of 
equity that could affect conservation success in a humped fashion, where the peak of the 
hump reflects the point in which conservation success is maximized. For example, some 
conservation initiatives favor current generations and disproportionately impose costs on 
future generations, indicating a humped shaped relationship that peaks early to reflect the 
bias towards current generations (Fig. 3c) (Dobbs, 1982).  
Generational equity would be difficult to achieve as a type of input equity given 
timeframes involved in most decision processes. In many societies, conservation success is 
generally assumed to increase linearly with increased gender equity inputs and outputs 
(Agarwal, 2009; Fig. 3a). However, conservation success probably peaks at a point that 
matches the power structure of a society. In many places, decisions are often made by, or 
favor, a single gender (Martin and Lemon, 2001; Agarwal, 2009, Tsikata and Golah, 2010), 
thus conservation success would peak at the point that reflects this power structure. Other 
types of equity, in particular social class and ethnicity, often reflect different power and 
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influence among groups within regions. In community forestry programs in Nepal, while 
socially dominant (higher caste) individuals make management decisions affecting all 
groups, lower caste social classes harvest a majority of the forest resources, and therefore 
conservation success is unlikely to occur until they are involved, even if at a minimal level. 
Yet, higher caste groups might not tolerate a substantial redistribution of decision-making 
rights among other social classes reflecting a humped relationship (Nightengale, 2002).  
 
3.4. Sigmoidal 
Types of equity that potentially have an asymptotic relationship to conservation 
success would exhibit a sigmoidal relationship in cases where some minimum threshold 
level of equity exists that is needed to achieve success. For example, in fisheries 
management based on individual transferable quotas, each fisher (or fisher group) is allowed 
a ‘catch share’ (i.e., access equity) that can be used, sold, or leased. This form of regulation 
is only likely to be successful if some minimum threshold of output equity is achieved, or in 
other words, fishermen are not entirely excluded from the process. If access equity 
increases, more people are given access to a smaller portion of the fishery, assuming a total 
allowable catch has been set and remains constant, and thus individual catch would 
decrease. In this case, probability of success likely plateaus at some intermediate level of 
equity (sigmoidal relationship). For example, the halibut and sablefish fisheries have 
historically supported a large number of small vessels (Fina, 2011).  Both set individual 
fishing quotas (IQFs) to reflect historic fisheries access, but entry into the fishery is limited. 
Thus, probability of success increases to a point where enough of the fishers buy into the 
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program, but probably plateaus at a point where entry (access equity) is limited and total 
allowable catch and catch shares remain steady. 
 
3.5. Additional aspects of the curves 
Some types of equity may express different relationship curves depending on the 
context. For example, with the catch allocation example in Section 3.4, if individuals 
become less satisfied with their shrinking allocation of catch with increasing equity, they 
may begin violating regulations, in turn decreasing conservation success at higher levels of 
equity (humped shape curve instead of sigmoidal). Similarly, the relationship between 
financial equity and conservation success may be humped if groups without much power or 
voice receive money that could have gone to groups that feel they deserve more, causing 
those groups to perceive the allocation as inequitable and unacceptable for success. 
A key unknown about any of the potential relationships between equity and conservation 
success is where the curve crosses an axis  (Fig. 1a, inset). It is often assumed that 
conservation interventions will fail without some minimum level of equity (Borrini et al. 
2004), such that the curves would intersect the x-axis at some value greater than zero. Yet 
there are other examples where conservation has been successful despite highly inequitable 
outcomes, for example where top-down management displaces local communities 
(Brockington, 2004; De Santo et al., 2011). In these cases, the curves would intersect the y-
axis at a value greater than zero. 
Additionally, different types of equity, each with its own curve, may be relevant and 
important within the same management plan. Such differences further challenge 
incorporating equity into conservation planning, but can be resolved at least partially by 
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efforts to elicit the relative importance of each type of equity to stakeholder groups and then 
incorporate those weights into formal multi-criteria decision making (Kittinger et al., 2014).  
 
4. Discussion 
We need a better understanding of the relationship between equity and conservation 
success, including when and how much social equity contributes to conservation success, to 
achieve conservation goals. We provide a conceptual foundation for understanding how and 
when different types of equity can influence conservation success relative to how equity is 
measured and perceived. Understanding the nature of these interactions between equity, 
conservation success, and economic return is fundamental for determining the feasibility of 
triple bottom line solutions. In conservation planning, expected conservation benefit is 
typically calculated as the product of probability of success and conservation benefit. In 
general, conservation benefit reflects both biodiversity conservation and economic 
efficiency objectives, addressing two pillars of the triple bottom line (Halpern et al. 2013). 
Here we demonstrate, in theory, how a third pillar, equity, potentially affects probability of 
conservation success (shown in Fig. 3), and how this in turn interacts with the way equity 
can limit potential conservation benefits (Fig. 4). The implication of these results is that 
equity can either exacerbate (Fig. 4b-d) or mitigate (Fig. 4a) the ability to achieve 
biodiversity and economic conservation objectives. In most cases, the optimal conservation 
outcome is achieved without perfect equity. In fact, high levels of equity could severely 
compromise conservation outcomes (e.g. Fig. 4c) if, for example, existing power structures 
are themselves inequitable, which highlights the risk of not considering the relationship 
between equity and probability of success. 
  
 
 31 
 
Fig. 4. The relationship between equity and conservation benefit (i.e., success), and how different 
relationships between probability of success (P(x), from (Fig. 3), given different levels of equity modifies the 
ability of the conservation intervention to achieve biodiversity conservation outcomes. The solid gray line 
shows a general possible trade-off between conservation benefit and equity (taken from Halpern et al. 2013). 
The dashed gray lines show four possible relationships between equity and probability of success, described 
in Fig. 3. The solid black lines are the resulting consequence of these probability relationships on the degree 
to which conservation success is achieved (expected conservation benefit). 
 
We simplified the problem by considering each type of equity separately, but 
acknowledge that complex relationships exist among specific types of equity and between 
context determinants (Adelman and Morris, 1973), and that these interactions influence the 
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degree of success. Further, we acknowledge that additional relationships are likely to exist 
(e.g., nonlinear shapes with multiple inflection points, flat lines where equity has no bearing 
on conservation success), and that the relationships may change through time, as people 
learn and adapt, and among communities that have different contexts. Similarly, different 
groups within a planning process may value different types of equity, and if those types 
influence the process (input equity) or respond differently to the conservation intervention 
(outcome equity), then overall conservation success could be compromised. A more indepth 
understanding of these relationships and interactions is important and will require empirical 
research focused on determining or evaluating specific relationships between the probability 
of success and equity, as well as how different types of equity are valued by stakeholders 
within a planning process (i.e., how much weight to give each one in planning decisions). 
Embarking on this substantial research agenda requires a conceptual foundation, which is 
the crux of this manuscript. 
Complicating matters further, the actual relationship between equity and 
conservation success may differ from the perceived relationship of equity for different 
individuals or groups (Webb et al., 2008). Perceptions of equity and conservation success 
reflect the values of those involved in, or affected by, a program or strategy, their 
expectations, and whether goals are achieved (Axford et al., 2008).  Perceptions are 
important as they lead people to change their behavior (e.g., whether or not to comply to 
new regulations) and/or lead to new conservation actions (Claus et al., 2010).  As with 
absolute equity, perceptions of equity will likely change through time and vary among 
individuals and communities, creating an additional challenge for understanding the 
relationship between equity and conservation success. Not all perceived values of 
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conservation (associated with either costs or benefits) will be tangible or easily quantifiable; 
yet assessing their relative importance has merit. Any type of equity in principle could be 
measured subjectively on a unitless scale of low to high. Formalization of problems that 
involve values can be an anathema to some, but the benefits of explicating integrating these 
issues into formal conservation planning are greater than ignoring perceived values 
altogether. 
Social equity in conservation has emerged from concern for environmental justice 
and fairness, in particularly, for those groups most affected by conservation interventions or 
most dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods. These issues reflect two important 
key ethical considerations. The first, which has been the primary focus of this paper, relates 
to how social equity among and between different groups might be represented in the 
process or outcomes of conservation planning. The second relates more specifically to how 
different types of equity are defined, by whom and for which groups. Goals reflect the 
values and beliefs of those individuals or groups that set them. We have suggested several 
key types of equity, but these are by no means exhaustive or prescriptive. Rather we provide 
a conceptual basis for articulating types of equity, the possible relationships between equity 
and conservation outcomes, and ways to interpret trade-offs among types of equity and 
between equity and conservation outcomes. Such a framework has the potential to inform 
and support rights-based approaches to conservation. It would be nearly impossible to 
consider all types of equity at once, thus conservation planners have to make some decision 
as to which types of equity to consider. Similar decisions are made when considering 
economic and ecological objectives, e.g., which actions to take to conserve which species 
(Bottrill et al., 2008). How these decisions are made will depend on the local context in 
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which the conservation intervention occurs, but we recommend an explicit conceptual 
framework to promote transparency and balance different perspectives. 
Our conceptual foundation provides a lens through which issues of equity and 
conservation success can be viewed and studied using empirical data. This foundation 
informs further research required to resolve outstanding issues, including: (1) empirical 
evidence to document and measure the frequency of occurrence and effect of different types 
of social equity on the probability of conservation success; (2) information on whether 
minimum thresholds of equity are required to achieve conservation success  (Fig. 3a); (3) 
data on the contribution of equity versus other factors in affecting conservation success 
among different interventions, and potential tradeoffs among these factors; (4) a systematic 
review to synthesize existing evidence on which types of interventions, and their relative 
conservation success, are most influenced by which types of social equity; and (5) 
definitions and perceptions of conservation success among and across different groups and 
contexts. Greater knowledge of these issues will improve our understanding of how and 
when to consider equity in conservation decisions making. 
Multiple objectives are common in conservation, yet there is not always consensus 
on objectives among individuals and groups. Conservation planning can only strive to 
achieve the stated objectives and ensure that the objectives are clear, measurable and 
identified through a transparent and participatory process with multiple stakeholders. 
Governments and organizations are increasingly moving away from purely biophysical 
approaches to biodiversity conservation to more holistic approaches based on sustainable 
human interactions, which require integration of environmental, social, and economic 
demands. Although substantial work has been done to promote the need for addressing 
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social factors in effective planning design and implementation (Ban et al., 2013), there has 
been little focus on social equity and its influence on conservation outcomes, despite the 
assumption that triple bottom line solutions are commonly held as ideal. We hope our work 
here will help improve conservation success by shedding light on how and why equity 
influences the probability of success, the consequences of not adequately considering equity 
on conservation outcomes, and provide guidance on tradeoffs among social equity, 
economic efficiency, and conservation effectiveness for conservation interventions. 
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Summary 
Equity is an increasingly important objective of conservation initiatives given both 
its influence on the likelihood of conservation success and its intrinsic value. However, 
research on and implementation of equity in conservation are compromised by two broad 
challenges — (1) equity is multidimensional and managers rarely know which dimensions 
matter most in their situation, and (2) scientific advances are compromised because 
experimentally manipulating equity outcomes in conservation interventions to advance our 
knowledge is beyond the scope of most conservation work and likely unethical in most 
cases. As a result, there is limited evidence on the types of equity that incentivize 
stakeholders to engage in conservation behaviors and little guidance for managers to 
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integrate equity effectively in their conservation actions. Here we overcome these hurdles 
using recent advances in describing equity and by linking stakeholder surveys with a 
behavioral experiment to examine how equity may be integrated into conservation more 
effectively. By understanding how different types of equity influence conservation 
behaviors in a community, managers can make better decisions about critical design 
elements that will affect conservation outcomes. Our results highlight a new approach using 
user surveys and behavioral experiments that may provide an efficient and cost-effective 
means to achieve better outcomes.  
 
1. Introduction 
Equity is an increasingly important objective of conservation initiatives because it 
has both intrinsic value and is commonly believed to influence the likelihood of 
conservation success. Evidence of this shift can be seen in new policies or organization 
mission statements that address inequality and promote equity broadly in sustainable 
development guidelines. One of the Food and Agricultural Organization’s guiding principles 
is “ensuring justice and fair treatment – both legally and in practice- to all people” (FAO 
2012). There has even been a shift in the framing of protected area conservation from 
sustainable livelihoods to equity (Schreckenber et al. 2016), as demonstrated by the IUCN’s 
commitment to “promote social equity in conservation and natural resource management, 
within a vision that embraces sustainable development and human well-being, as well as 
maintenance and restoration of integrity and diversity of nature [due to the] recognition that 
social equity is not only a matter of basic human rights, but also a way to increase the 
efficiently and sustainability of our international efforts” (IUCN 2004). The Center for 
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Biological Diversity’s Strategic Plan for 2011-2020 also states: “By 2020, at least 10 per 
cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity 
and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, 
ecologically representative and well-connected systems of protected areas and other 
effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscape and 
seascape” (CBD Strategic Plan 2011-2020, Goal C, Target 11, Nagoya 2010). These issues 
are particularly relevant for small-scales fisheries, where the FAO aims “to contribute to the 
equitable development of small-scale fishing communities and poverty eradication and to 
improve the socio-economic situation of fisheries and fish workers within the context of 
sustainable fisheries management” (FAO 2015). 
Despite the growing perceived importance of equity in conservation, there is still little 
empirical evidence about how equity actually affects conservation outcomes. As a result, 
managers have little practical guidance for how to strategically consider equity in 
conservation planning. Two challenges are key. First, equity is multidimensional, including 
issues of participation, access, or financial benefits. Yet, there is little clarity on which 
components of equity matter in particular contexts. For example, participation equity (e.g., 
stakeholder engagement) in the design process for a new management action may be most 
impactful in some settings, while equity in expected outcomes from the action may be most 
impactful in others. Second, advancing our scientific understanding of these equity issues is 
difficult because manipulating degrees of equity in conservation interventions is beyond the 
scope of most conservation work and is likely unethical and unwelcome by many 
communities.  
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Progress requires understanding how to first, describe and measure equity, then 
expand and consider if and how each measure affects outcomes, how different equities 
interact, and how these relationships vary in different locations and context.  Only then can 
practitioners consider how to integrate equity into practice.  
Different people have different opinions about what is equitable and which benefits 
and costs matter most (Gelcich et al. 2008), such that one ideally would map all of these 
connections and values for each individual within a community, not just each community.  
Although it is clear that people vary in how they value equity, disentangling the relevant 
dimensions relevant to management decision-making has been challenging.  
Two recent and complementary approaches have attempted to describe equity in 
conservation. Klein et al. (2015) proposed a framework to categorize several general types 
of equity into input or outcome equity that relate to conservation interventions: 
participation, spatial, access and financial. Participation equity is an input into a 
conservation intervention (also referred to as process equity), whereas spatial, access and 
financial equities are outcomes of a conservation intervention. In contrast, Franks et al. 
(2016) propose an equity framework that describes a third category - recognition equity – 
along with procedure equity and distribution equity as interlinked principles that are critical 
to the establishment, assessment, governance, and management of protected areas.  
 These two approaches are similar but include slightly different focal issues. The 
Klein et al. approach offers categories of outcome (or distributional) equity by which to 
identify different recipients of costs and benefits. They describe different ways of grouping 
people that reflect common sociopolitical stratifications and predict that different groups of 
people have different experiences with different metrics of equity.  The Franks et al. 
  
 
 42 
approach highlights the importance of recognizing and accepting the legitimacy of rights, 
values, interests and priorities of different actors and respecting their human dignity. 
Depending on how they are measured, these could be included in Klein et al.’s participation 
(input) equity.  
  With all of these potential types of equity, we are faced with the challenge of 
understanding what types of equity matter to managers in particular situations, both 
normatively and in terms of achieving conservation outcomes. We have synthesized a 
growing interdisciplinary equity literature (Klein et al. 2015, Brown et al. 2017, Halpern et 
al. 2013) to investigate three key questions managers have to navigate: which equity 
dimensions matter most, whether equity or equality is more important, and how to measure 
each equity dimension.  These decisions likely have large consequences for conservation 
outcomes (Klein et al. 2015). Any misjudgment could result in wasted resources, lack of 
community support, and ultimately failed conservation.  
 The first question managers have to navigate is which components of equity are 
most important for conservation success (Klein et al. 2015). There are different schools of 
thought. Some political science literature suggests that process equity may matter more than 
outcomes (Tyler and Steven 2003, MacCoun 2005) as evident by a number of influential 
natural resource management policies seeking social equity through participation (such as 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1998, Berkes 2004, Reed 2008). 
Other literature suggests that outcome equity is more important (Mills 1963, Cohen-Charash 
and Spector 2001, Loomis and Ditton 2011).  Different types of equity may also interact 
(De Cremer et al. 2010, Nicklin et al. 2014). For example, managers may believe that 
participation and outcome equities are related, or that access equity and financial equity are 
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linked. There may also be demographic differences in perceived importance (e.g., across 
ages or gender) that require managers to take targeted responses to different subgroups. 
As an example, implementing the California Marine Life Protection Act (CMLPA) 
required managers to consider the most appropriate type of equity and navigate tradeoffs 
between different types of equity. The CMLPA of 1999 required the Department of Fish 
and Game (now called the Department of Fish and Wildlife) to develop and implement a 
network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) along the California coast to increase the 
coherence and effectiveness of protecting the state's marine life, habitat, and ecosystems. 
MPAs are spatially explicit management tools that restrict the use and access areas of the 
ocean. The CMLPA failed twice to implement because stakeholders felt excluded from the 
design process (Weible et al. 2004). Success was only possible when the Department of Fish 
and Game explicitly addressed participation equity and adopted a highly participatory 
process involving Stakeholder Working Groups (Weible et al. 2004). In this case, 
participation equity was critical for implementation but resulted in a sub-optimal network of 
MPAs in terms of achieving other types of outcome equities (Rassweiler et al. 2014).  
The next question managers have to address is whether equal or equitable outcomes 
will be more successful. Equity and equality are different concepts, and often an equal 
outcome is not the most equitable one. Optimal or successful management actions would 
differ depending on whether stakeholders’ value. For example, many fisheries are moving 
towards a quota share system where certain users are allocated a portion of a total allowable 
catch. One major question managers have to answer is how to allocate the shares: Does 
everyone get an equal share or are shares allocated based upon past catch or some other 
measure?  
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Lastly, managers must decide how to measure equity (Klein et al. 2015). Measuring 
equity allows for 1) consideration of how successful efforts were at targeting the right types 
of equity, 2) evaluation of equity as its own objective, and 3) consideration of equity in 
relation to other conservation objectives. Determining the appropriate way to measure 
equity requires consideration of subjective and objective approaches (Halpern et al. 2013). 
The subjective approach can measure equity when it is used synonymously with fairness 
(Blanchard 1986). Subjective measurements of equity emphasize the evolution of a person’s 
own life, especially their life situation (a cognitive evaluation, Morales and Harris 2014, 
Nightingale 2011). In contrast, the objective approach often measures equity in terms of 
equality, and uses indicators such a material resources (e.g. income, food, housing, boat) 
and social attributes (e.g. social connections, education, political processes) to describe 
distributions.  
To address these practical challenges, we explore an interdisciplinary approach that 
combines surveys and behavioral experiments to assess what aspects of equity matter most 
to stakeholders in a given context. We use small scale fisheries in the Philippines as a case 
study to explore how critical information about equity that can be gleaned from surveys and 
a behavioral experiment. We focus on 5 different municipalities in the Tañon Strait in the 
Philippines to get the information needed to inform management efforts to integrate equity 
into practice. Our approach is designed to be easily replicable and offers a pathway that 
managers can take to operationalize their effective integration of equity issues into their 
management plans and actions. 
 
2. Methods 
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2.1. Conceptual approach  
The different dimensions of equity as put forth by Klein et al. motivates 
investigating how people perceive the different dimensions of equity and how well these 
equity dimensions predict peoples’ conservation behavior (i.e. resource extraction and 
willingness to punish defectors). We demonstrate how managers can use surveys and 
behavioral games grounded in theory to answer important equity related questions and guide 
management actions. Our approach can be applied to a variety of settings where equity 
plays a role in outcomes.   
We first document peoples’ conservation behaviors, then document how people perceive 
equity. We examine if the perceived importance of different types of equity relate to each 
other and if different user groups cluster together in their perceptions of equity. These 
insights are gleaned from individual surveys. We then ask whether subjective perceptions of 
equity relate to conservation behaviors observed in a behavioral experiment. Behavioral 
experiments are uniquely suited to revealing the relationships between equity and 
conservation outcomes, because they present real world scenarios where practitioners and 
academics alike can glean rapid insights into what dimensions of equity are associated with 
conservation behaviors without the ethical dilemmas of doing real world experiments on 
people.  
 Finally, we compare subjective and objective measures of economic equality to each 
other. Objective measures of equity typically use metrics of equality – e.g., economic 
equality as measured by the Gini coefficient (Halpern et al. 2013, Voss et al. 2014, Brown et 
al. 2017). However, if stakeholders perceive economic equity as a fair distribution of returns 
that is not necessarily equal across stakeholders, objective metrics such as a Gini coefficient 
  
 
 46 
may misrepresent stakeholder goals.   
 The potential insights from a combination of stakeholder surveys and behavioral 
experiments allows managers to gain practical insights for the strategic integration of equity 
into conservation planning. Surveys provide rapid insights into stakeholder perceptions 
relevant to equity. Well-designed behavioral experiments provide complementary tests of 
how these perceptions affect individual actions, because participants bring their real-world 
experiences and biases into the game scenario. The combination of these two 
complementary approaches may provide managers with practical tools for greatly enhancing 
the efficacy of conservation actions.  
 
2.2. Case Study  
The Tañon Strait in the Philippines is an excellent setting to investigate equity and 
conservation. It lies between the islands of Negros and Cebu in the Philippines. The Strait is 
one of the greatest nearshore fish biodiversity hotspots on the planet (Carpenter and 
Springer 2005), making it a prime conservation target. It hosts many different ecosystems 
and habitats, including coral reefs, mangroves, and seagrass meadows, many protected 
marine mammals, and over 7,100 fish species. Although the Strait has the largest marine 
protected area in the Philippines, anthropogenic pressure has caused the reefs to become 
severely degraded; now only 5% of the approximately 27,000 square kilometers of reefs are 
listed as being in “excellent condition” (Gomez et al. 1994). This pressure is primarily the 
result of insufficient enforcement, destructive and illegal fishing activity, and pollution. 
Roughly 2.1 million people (NSO 2010) from the 42 surrounding municipalities and cities 
in the three provinces of Cebu, Negros Oriental and Negros Occidental depend on the 
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resources of Tañon Strait for food, livelihood, and shelter (Lucas and Kirit 2009). The 
majority of coastal residents engage in fishing, and about one quarter of those who fish 
report all of their cash income to be derived from fishing (TSPS-GMP). The most popular 
fishing-related activities are catching and selling fish and intertidal invertebrates. Fishers in 
Tañon Strait use a variety of fishing gears, including gillnets, hook-and lines, squid jigs, and 
beach seines. Although all of these gears are technically illegal, all are tolerated.    
The Tañon Strait Protected Seascape – General Management Plan (TSPS-GMP) 
envisions “a Protected Seascape with natural biodiversity and integrity, which is effectively 
managed by all stakeholders to ensure ecological integrity and resilience, sustainable socio-
economic development and communities living in harmony with nature” (TSPS-GMP). 
Prior to TSPS-GMP, nearshore fisheries in Tañon Straight have been open access, meaning 
there are no restricted users. TSPS-GMS is now implementing territorial user rights fisheries 
(TURFs), which provide exclusive fishing access to a defined group of fishers. The TURFs 
are also divided into two types of zones with different resource uses: core areas that ban all 
fishing and surrounding areas that allow fishing only by TURF owners.  
In total, we studied 245 fishers from 5 different municipalities on the island of Cebu 
– Alegria, Sanboan, Santander, Ginatilan, and Badian. This collection of municipalities was 
chosen to explore the broader analytical goal of describing variation in the perceptions of 
equity. Fishers completed surveys and participated in behavioral games. All participants 
were fishers and were recruited by local NGO partners. Fishers were randomly assigned a 
number to remain anonymous. Each fisher received 500 pesos (USD10) for attending and 
had the opportunity to earn an additional 50 to 500 pesos (USD1-10) depending on how 
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they played the behavior experiment. This pay out reflects real-world and opportunity costs 
for these fishers.   
 
2.3. Procedure  
Fishers were divided into four groups that each played at a separate time. Note that 
the groups were treatments that varied in group formation and ability to communicate (See 
Chapter 3) and required us to consider “post-treatment” bias in our analysis. All game 
instructions and materials were written and communicated verbally. The written game 
instructions included examples and possible actions and outcomes. Facilitators explained 
three hypothetical game scenarios and asked participants a series of pay out questions based 
on the given scenario. After each question, facilitators talked through the correct answer and 
answered any questions. Then facilitators played a mock PDG. Players were encouraged to 
ask questions if they did not understand. Fishers played three different games with three 
different partners within their group. There was no opportunity to learn what the other 
person played at any point. This is referred to as a “one shot” game, and it prevents 
participants from learning and altering their future game behavior and from retaliating in the 
real world outside of the game context. After the game participants completed two surveys 
designed to measure individual differences in experiences of equity primarily outside of the 
game in participants’ real-world lives.  
 
2.4. Survey  
We developed our survey with Rare, our local partner in the Philippines, in order to 
ensure we asked contextually appropriate questions that would allow us to capture 
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meaningful and relevant responses. Our surveys use “fairness” synonymously with “equity” 
(Blanchard 1986). Given that equity is often vaguely defined and subjective, our surveys 
were designed so players considered equality and fairness separately and considered overall, 
participation, access, and financial types of equity separately. Players therefore completed 
one survey right after playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game about overall equality, and 
participation, access, and financial fairness in their real-world lives, as well as how fair the 
games rule were. Several hours later players then completed the second survey about overall 
fairness and participation, access, and financial relative benefits compared to others, and 
overall wellbeing. During this “wash out” time, participants ate food and listened to music, 
so that their answers to the second survey were less likely influenced by their answers to the 
first survey. All responses are in a Likert scale format. We also asked two comprehensive 
questions immediately post play to test participant understanding, resulting in a sample size 
of 210 people who showed full understanding. We were able the run the analyses with all 
players and without players who did not show full understanding, and found no significant 
difference in our results. Survey variables are presented in Table 2 (See Appendix Survey).  
Each fisher’s pay out was from a randomly selected round at the end of the day to ensure 
there were no repercussions during play or while filling out the surveys. 
 
2.5. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
We used a common behavioral experiment to explore the influence of equity issues 
on conservation behaviors. The standard PDG presents a scenario where two individuals can 
achieve the highest overall collective benefit by cooperating or can achieve the highest 
individual benefit by acting in their own self-interest. The catch is that if both parties act 
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selfishly, a response known as defecting, both participants fare worse than if they had 
cooperated.  
We customized the PDG to reflect real world conditions in small scale fisheries like 
those in the Tañon Strait. Fishers have to make decisions about how many fish to harvest 
and if they are willing to punish those who violate fishing regulations at the potential risk of 
facing social repercussions. Fisheries management increasingly relies on fishers to punish 
perpetrators, even when punishing is not the cultural norm (as in Tañon Strait). As such, 
those who punish are often subject to community backlash. Behavioral scientists call this 
“altruistic punishment,” because it means imposing punishment comes at a personal cost 
(Fehr and Gächter 2002).  
We use a specific game known as a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game,1 because it 
provides a simple measure of relevant cooperation that is easy to execute in the field 
(Janssen 2008). Two players must weigh the individual versus group benefit when deciding 
how much of a shared resource harvest. They also must decide if they want to punish their 
partner if s/he over harvests. The payoff structure for this Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 
presented in Table 1. If both players harvest the mandated amount, they both get to keep six 
fish and a sustainably healthy fish stock will be maintained. By contrast, if one player 
defects and harvests more than the norm (10 fish), then the other player gets a much smaller 
catch (two fish as opposed to 6 fish), because there are not enough fish to sustainably 
                                               
1 Flood and Dresher developed the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in 1950. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game describes a situation where two 
prisoners are suspected of robbery and taken into custody. However, police do not have enough evidence to convict them of the crime, only 
to convict them on the charge of possession of stolen goods. If neither of the prisoners confesses (i.e. they cooperate with each other), they 
will both be charged the lesser sentence of one year. The police will question them on separate interrogation rooms so the two prisoners 
cannot communicate. The police will try to convince each prisoner to confess the crime by offering them a “get out of jail free card”, while 
the other prisoner will be sentenced to a ten years term. If both prisoners confess, each prisoner will be sentenced to six years. Both prisoners 
are offered the same deal and know the consequences of each action and are completely aware that the other prisoner has been offered the 
exact same deal.  
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harvest 16 fish. However, if the player who complied punishes the defector, the defector’s 
payout will be 5 fish (10 minus the punishment of 5 fish), and the punisher’s payout will be 
0 fish (1 minus the cost to punish of 1 fish). If both players defect (10 fish each, 20 fish in 
total, called mutual defection), and don’t punish, each player will only receive 1 fish. Both 
players have the same opportunities and know the consequences of each action. For our 
purposes here, we will not discuss the full game scenario, payout structure and game theory. 
Please refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the game and note that there 
exists an extensive literature on game theory that applies to marine conservation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 P, C N, C P, D N, D 
P, C 6, 6* 6, 6 0, 5 0, 5 
N, C 6, 6 6, 6 1, 10* 1, 10 
P, D 5, 0 10, 1* -4, -4 1, -3 
N, D 5, 0 10, 1 -3, 1 2, 2* 
Table 1 Prisoner’s Dilemma payout bi-matrix with opportunity to altruistically punish. Strategies are 
represented as follows: P= Punish, N = No punish, C = Comply, D = Defect. Comply = 6 fish, Defect = 10 
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fish, Cost to punish = -1 fish, Punishment for defecting = -5 fish. Asterisks represent pure Nash equilibria. 
Each strategy has a probability of being played, shown in parentheses. 
 
2.6. Analytical goals and approaches 
We aimed to answer three key questions, summarized in Table 2, that focus on 
understanding how stakeholders perceive and are influenced by it in their conservation 
behaviors. Conservation interventions will either reinforce or change how people perceive 
equity, and approach allows managers to describe equity and to strategically consider how 
its actions might influence stakeholder behaviors that influence conservation outcomes.  
Key question Approach to get the empirical evidence needed to inform the key  
Are equity inputs or 
outcomes more important 
for conservation success? Describe variation in perceptions of equity. Show the relationship between different experiences of equity and 
conservation behaviors. 
Investigate how different types of equity interact with each other. 
Are equal or equitable 
inputs and/or outcomes 
more important for 
conservation outcomes? 
How should equity be 
measured? 
Investigate the relationship between subjective and objective measures of 
equity. 
Table 2. Managers can answer these three key questions relevant to the design and implementation of 
conservation interventions with empirical evidence and the approach suggested.  
 
In order to describe the variation in equity, we first quantified the heterogeneity of 
perceptions of different types of equity among user groups. The 5-point Likert-scale survey 
data for measures of fairness, marine resource dependence, age and sex were treated as 
numeric data, whereas data for measures of overall and relative equality were treated as 
ordinal data (Agresti and Finlay 1997). Because our data are in Likert scale the differences 
between responses are not necessarily equal, so the mean may appear to be the neutral or 
middle response but may not fairly characterize the data. We categorized the data as 
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binomial because players who harvested 6 fish were “cooperators” and players who 
harvested 10 fish were “defectors” (R code included in Supplemental Materials).  
We completed regression analysis relating different dimensions of equity to 
conservation behaviors. This approach is most appropriate for our analytical goal, because it 
allows us to estimate the relationship among many independent variables (equity and 
demographics) and one dependent variable (behavior).  The main parameters of interest in 
our regression models are the outcome variables for behavior- if fishers cooperate or defect 
in number of fish harvested, and if they choose to punish defectors or not. We fit two 
generalized linear regression models (GLMs), clustering by individual, for both harvest and 
punishment. The response variable, Yi , is binomially distributed (participants either 
cooperate or defect),  is the intercept and  is the slope:  
i 
The GLM included clustering by individual, since each participant played three 
rounds and there is a lack of independence between observations. We also clustered standard 
errors by individual. We completed all analyses twice - once restricted to players who 
correctly answered both questions that checked for understanding, and once with no 
exclusions.  
Multicollinearity was tested for and found not to be a problem in compliance (i.e., 
there were no variance inflation factors, VIF, above 10, e.g. Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter 
2004). However, we did find multicollinearity in punishment (Relative Access and Relative 
Participation VIF > 10). We then ran the model with Relative Access removed and used an 
analysis of variance to identify significant differences in mean scores between the original 
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model and the slimmed down model. We did this for Relative Participation as well. We 
found both variables to be significant and were therefore unable to remove them from the 
original model. Next, we used a Ridge Regression to shrink the collinearity between 
estimates towards zero. In our ridge model,  is the probability of punishment for a given 
value of ,  is the intercept and  is the slope:  
 
We considered if equity mediate the relationship between treatment effect and 
cooperation to meet our analytical goal of understanding how equity predicts behavior. 
Since our surveys were completed after the game (i.e. “post-treatment”), we took 
precautions interpreting the results. We completed mediation analysis and are satisfied that 
treatment conditions did not affect equity responses, with the exception of how fair people 
perceived the rules of the game to be (which was expected). Our methods do not allow for 
causal inference, but by understanding what experiences of equity are predictive of 
conservation behaviors managers may select interventions that better integrate these 
dimensions and ultimately arrive at better conservation outcomes even when the underlying 
causal drivers are not known.  
To investigate how different types of equity relate to each other, we performed a 
cluster analysis. We used the mclust package in R (3.3.1) to find the Pearson correlation 
coefficient measuring the strength (linear association) of relationship between different 
types of equity. This approach applies the maximum likelihood estimation and Bayes 
criteria to identify the most likely model and number of clusters. The mclust package selects 
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the optimal model according to Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for expectation 
maximizing (EM) initialized by hierarchical clustering for parameterized Gaussian mixture 
models. We report the model and number of clusters with the largest BIC (-8285.639). 
Lastly, we ran a linear regression to compare perceived financial fairness and 
equality (subjective measurements) and estimated weekly income (an objective 
measurement). We ran the model with only participants who identified as having high 
income dependence on marine resources under the assumption that they would be more 
sensitive to financial implications and thus more aware of the relationship. However, we our 
results are similar across all levels of income dependence.  
 
2.7. Precautions 
Both surveys were completed after the PDG, so we are aware of the potential for 
post treatment bias (meaning that the treatment conditions of the game may have somehow 
influenced player survey responses). We therefore conducted a mediation analysis to 
determine if treatment influenced survey responses (see Supplemental Material). We also 
ensured there was no significant difference in survey responses across treatments (with the 
exception of whether players believed the rules of the game were fair or not).  
 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Variation in perceptions of equity 
Our study is the first that we are aware of that specifically documents heterogeneity 
in how people perceive different types of equity and how different types of equity relate to 
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each other. Overall, Tañon Strait fishers vary widely in their perceptions of equity (Table 3, 
Fig. 2). The medians and means show fishers perceive themselves as having medium 
wellbeing and a somewhat equal and fair distribution of benefits associated with marine 
resources (all medians = 3). Likewise, more fishers perceive themselves as having equal 
access to marine resources. Fishers believe financial benefits are fairly distributed, but also 
that they have slightly more than others in their community (both medians = 2). This may 
reflect the open access nature and largely subsistence economy of the Strait. Fishers also 
believe they participate more than others in marine resource decision-making (median = 2), 
suggesting the current management does a good job of making people feel engaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Question Mean Median Std. Deviation 
1 Overall equality 
How equal do you think overall benefits 
associated with marine resources are 
distributed in your community? 
2.76 3 1.37 
2 Overall wellbeing What is your overall wellbeing? 2.72 3 1.40 
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3 Overall fairness 
How fair do you think overall benefits 
associated with marine resources are in your 
community 
2.81 3 1.42 
4 Fair access How fair do you think access is to marine resources in your community? 2.94 3 1.34 
5 Fair financial How fair do you think financial benefits are distributed in your community? 2.57 2 1.50 
6 Fair participation How fair do you think participation in fisheries management is in your community? 2.94 3 1.46 
7 Relative access benefits 
How does your access to marine resources 
compare to others’ access to marine resources? 3.64 3 1.53 
8 Relative financial benefits 
How do you feel you benefit financially 
from fisheries compared to others in your 
community? 
2.66 2 1.60 
9 
Relative 
participation 
benefits 
How does your participation in fisheries 
management activities compare to others’ 
participation in fisheries management 
activities? 
2.60 2 1.45 
Table 3 Survey variables and questions with means, medians and standard deviations. For variable 1, 
responses are in a Likert scale where 1 = Completely equal and 5 = Completely unequal. For variable 2, 
responses are in a Likert scale where 1 = high wellbeing, and 5 = low wellbeing. For variables 3-6, response 
are in a Likert scale where 1 = Very Fair and 5 = Very unfair. For variables 7-9, responses are in a Likert 
scale where 1 = I have a lot more than others, 3 = I have the same as others, and 5 = I have a lot less than 
others.  
 
Figure 2 Heterogeneity of participants’ dimensions of equity. There is large variability in how stakeholders 
perceive different types of equity – we highlight equality (a) and fairness (b) here.  
 
3.2. Equity’s interaction with each other types of equity  
There are no clear associations between different types of equity in this community 
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of fishers (Fig. 3, SM 3). This is also a surprising result and suggests to managers in Tañon 
Strait that how people perceive participation management decision-making is not related to 
how they perceive conservation outcomes. Across all the equity measures, the strongest 
association is between perceived wellbeing and overall fairness (Fig. 3, r = 0.53).    
We find that perceived measures of how fair marine resources are distributed 
throughout the community do not reflect how equal fishers perceive the distribution of 
benefits throughout the community to be (Fig. 4). If perceived equity and equality aligned, 
fishers who perceived a very fair distribution would also perceive an equal distribution, and 
fishers who perceived a very unfair distribution would also perceive an unequal distribution 
– which they do not. Rather, we find that a fair outcome is associated with an unequal 
distribution of benefits (Fig. 4).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Descriptive correlation 
matrix of different types of equity. 
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Figure 4 Perceived fairness of how 
marine resources are distributed 
throughout the community compared to 
how fishers perceive the equality of the 
distribution of benefits throughout the 
community. 
 
 
3.3. Relationship between subjective and objective measures of equity 
Lastly, our results show that objective and subjective measures of equity do not 
always align (Fig. 5). Although we acknowledge that our experiment was not designed to 
make strong inferences comparing subjective and objective measures, our results indicate 
that an objective measure of income does not relate to how people perceive financial 
benefits or equality. If subjective and objective measures were related, average earners 
would identify as earning relatively the same as others, and high earners would identify as 
earning relatively more than others. Neither is true. We find no significant relationship 
between perceived financial fairness and weekly income (ß = 40.68, p = 0.623). We also 
find no significant difference in the scores for relative financial benefits and weekly income 
(ß = -70.68, p = 0.391).  
However, low earners accurately identify having a lot less than others (Fig. 5), 
perhaps because they are more aware of their hardships than higher earners. 
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Figure 5 Subjective measure of financial equality 
compared to and objective measure of financial 
equality. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Demographic differences in conservation behaviors 
We observe a number of significant differences in conservation behaviors by 
different demographic groups (Fig. 6, Tables 4 and 5). Female fishers significantly comply 
more than their male counterparts (ß =1.029, p = 0.004) and punish significantly less (ß =-
3.201, p = 1.045e-05). We find that older fishers punish significantly less than younger 
fishers (ß =-3.201, p < 0.000). Fishers who depend a lot on marine resources for their 
income punish significantly more (ß = 1.124, p = 0.001), whereas fishers who depend a lot 
on marine resources for subsistence punish significantly less (ß = -1.669, p = 9.867e-08). 
  
3.5 .Relationship between equity and conservation behavior  
Certain perceptions of equity predict conservation behaviors in our experimental 
game (Fig. 6, Tables 4 and 5). The key results include:  
3.5.1. Fair rules  
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Both compliance and punishment significantly decrease when fishers perceive the 
rules of the game to be unfair (ß = -0.471, p = 8.2e-06; ß -0.844, p = 0.001).  
3.5.2. Access  
Perceived access also plays an important role in cooperation – perceptions of relative 
access to marine resources significantly predict compliance and punishment. Fishers who 
perceive the same (ß = 1.254, p = 0.002), more (ß = 1.311, p = 0.008), or a lot more (ß = 
1.413, p = 0.013) relative benefits comply the most. Fishers who perceive themselves as 
having less or the same access to marine resources as other community members punish 
significantly more (ß = 4.961, p = .242e-05; ß = 3.73 8, p = 7.630e-06), versus fishers who 
perceive themselves as having more or a lot more access as compared to others punish 
significantly less (ß = -4.241, p = 0.003; ß =-3.796, p = 0.003). Likewise, punishment is also 
significantly associated with how fair access to marine resources is perceived, where 
perceptions of unfair access have a significantly negatively effect on punishment (ß = -
1.259, p = 3.178e-07).  
 3.5.3. Participation  
Our results point to the importance of participation in resource management decision 
making for punishment in Tañon Strait. Unfair perceptions of participation have a 
significantly negative association with punishment (ß = -1.240, p < 0.000). By contrast, 
fishers who perceive themselves as participating in the middle categories (i.e., less, the same 
or more), punish significantly more (ß = 0.905, p = 0.058; ß = 1.265, p = 0.015; ß = 1.750, p 
= 0.005) than fishers who perceive their participation at the extremes (i.e., much less or 
much more).  
 3.5.4. Finances 
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Lastly, we find that fishers who perceive themselves as having more financial 
benefits punish significantly more (ß = 23.799, p < 2.2e-16).  
 
Figure 6 (A) Compliance and (B) Punishment predicted by survey variables using a generalized linear 
model (Model 1 in Tables 2 and 3). 
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 Dependent variable: 
 Compliance 
 (1) (2) 
Fair Game Rule -0.701 (4.8e-05***) -0.471 (8.2e-06***) 
Perceived Wellbeing -1.145 (0.376)  
Overall Fairness -0.032 (0.851)  
Overall Equality 0.0710 (0.646)  
Financial Fairness 0.099 (0.584)  
Access Fairness -0.166 (0.4232)  
Participation Fairness 0.056 (0.674)  
Less Financial Benefits 0.320 (0.581)  
The Same Financial 
Benefits -0.288 (0.597)  
More Financial Benefits -0.357 (0.749)  
A Lot More Financial 
Benefits -1.620 (0.185)  
Less Participation 0.345 (0.552)  
The Same Participation 0.484 (0.499)  
More Participation 0.007 (0.992)  
A Lot More Participation 0.911 (0.311)  
Less Access 1.0378 (0.127) 0.830 (0.104) 
The Same Access 1.888 (0.001***) 1.254  (0.002**) 
More Access 2.981 (0.003**) 1.311 (0.008**) 
A Lot More Access 3.829 (0.001**) 1.413 (0.013*) 
Income Dependence -0.267 (0.367)  
Subsistence Dependence -0.209 (0.463)  
Age 0.001 (0.951)  
Sex 1.216 (0.012*) 1.029 (0.004**) 
Constant 2.001 (0.199) 0.968  (0.045*) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 263.72 361.94  
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 4 Compliance results. Baseline treatment conditions show that participants comply 54% of the time. 
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 Dependent Variable: 
Punishment  
 (1) (2) Adjusted for Multicollinearity 
Fair Game Rules -0.855 (0.002 **) -0.844 (0.001 ***) -0.319 
Perceived Wellbeing -0.031 (0.903)  -0.085 
Overall Fairness -0.246 (0.260)  -0.123 
Overall Equality -0.719 (0.002 **) -0.675 (0.006 **) -0.344 
Financial Fairness 0.272(0.380)  0.070 
Access Fairness -1.198 (1.027e-07 ***) -1.259 (3.178e-07 ***) -0.489 
Participation Fairness -1.226 (0.002 **) -1.240 (0.000 ***) -0.627 
Less Financial Benefits -0.199 (0.816) -0.416 (0.523) 0.134 
The Same Financial Benefits -0.323 (0.500) -0.556 (0.345) -0.084 
More Financial Benefits 23.917 (3.444e-14 ***) 23.799 (< 2.2e-16 ***) 4.298 
A Lot More Financial 
Benefits -0.239 (0.923) -0.384 (0.869) 
-0.349 
Less Participation 3.974 (0.003*) 3.930 (0.001 ***) 1.723 
The Same Participation 1.022 (0.407) 1.265 (0.015 *) 0.276 
More Participation 2.464 (0.033 *) 1.750 (0.005 **) 0.793 
A Lot More Participation -1.762 (0.305) -1.848 (0.332) -1.092 
Less Access 5.012 (0.001 ***) 4.961 (1.242e-05 ***) 1.728 
The Same Access 4.115 (0.001 ***) 3.73 8(7.630e-06 ***) 1.237 
More Access -4.556 (0.007 **) -4.241 (0.003 **) -1.370 
A Lot More Access -3.467 (0.005 **) -3.796 (0.003**) -1.628 
Income Dependence 0.890 (0.031 *) 1.124 (0.001 **) 0.455 
Subsistence Dependence -1.512 (0.000 ***) -1.669 (9.867e-08 ***) -0.623 
Age 0.093 (0.000 ***) 0.081 (0.000 ***) 0.031 
Sex -2.981 (2.454e-06 ***) -3.201 (1.045e-05 ***) -1.727 
Constant 2.832 (0.193) 3.636 (0.091 .) 2.358 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 168.89 164.81  
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
Table 5 Punishment results. Note that when adjusting for multicollinearity with Ridge Regression, 
collinearity shrinks close to zero. However, there is some collinearity effect still present. Thus there is no 
concept of significance. Baseline treatment conditions show that participants punish 25.7% percent of the 
time. 
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4. Discussion  
Given that equity is increasingly a sought-after goal in conservation, managers need 
guidance how to incorporate it into decision-making and measure it. Our results were 
attainable in a reasonable amount of time and effort using complementary surveys and a 
behavioral experiment that provide important insights to managers looking for ways to 
improve outcomes. Since there are no other studies that have produced such a 
comprehensive view of the diverse roles of equity, we cannot evaluate the generality of the 
findings to other settings. Nonetheless, there are important lessons learned for Tañon Strait 
resource management.  
 
4.1. Which type of equity should managers focus on? 
Our results suggest that Tañon Strait managers focus on several types of equity. 
First, actions promoting equal access to marine resources will likely increase compliance 
and punishment. Second, actions promoting fair participatory processes will likely increase 
punishment. Third, actions that make fishers feel as though they have a financial advantage 
will bolster punishment. These three findings suggest specific actions could enhance the 
success of future management actions. 
4.2. Equal or unequal outcomes for fairness?  
Our results show that Tañon Strait fishers consider the fairest distribution to be an 
unequal distribution, supporting social psychology literature finding that fishers perceive 
fairness and equality differently on average (Tornblom and Jonsson 1985). This finding 
suggests management plans in this region that understand and include the pre-intervention 
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hierarchy of access benefits may have more success than if access rights are given out 
equally to all stakeholders. 
Our result that fishers both comply and punish more when they perceive the game 
rules to be fair suggests that in the real world they will be more likely to participate in 
conservation behaviors if they perceive management regulations to be fair. Fishers who 
perceive the game rules as unfair may be compared to stakeholders in the real world who 
perceive regulations to be unfair, who then become dissatisfied (Adams 1965, Karriker and 
Williams 2009). This dissatisfaction can potentially cause intervention failure (Pitcher et al. 
2009, Agnew et al. 2009, Loomis and Ditton 1993) because they do not cooperate. These 
results lend support to other findings in behavioral ecology (Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003, 
Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gatcher 2002) and natural resource management (Zubair and 
Garforth 2006, Klein et al. 2009, Karriker and Williams 2009, Lam and Pitcher 2012) that 
stakeholders’ cooperation is largely determined by whether or not they perceive the 
regulations as fair. Likewise, managers cannot use the simplest objective metric for a trade-
off analysis unless there is evidence that it truly represents the outcomes of interest.  
 
4.3. How should managers measure equity outcomes?  
Managers in Tañon Strait are now armed with the knowledge that objective and 
subjective measures of equity do not always align. This finding may have broader 
implications since the subjective approach has been used to measure perceived distributions 
of costs and benefits and may be a composite self-weighted evaluation of multiple types of 
objective socioeconomic status (Marmot and Wilkinson 1999, McDate 2001, Operario, 
Alder and Williams 2004). By contrast, the objective approach has typically been used to 
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measure the equality of participation in decision-making processes – as measured by the 
number of people involved in the process – or financial outcomes – as measured by dollars 
per individual. However, objective measures often fail to capture less obvious aspects of an 
individual’s life, such as household conditions, perceived mobility, social networks and 
community influences, that could inform the “lived experience” of wellbeing and inequality 
(Heuveline, Guillot and Gwatkin 2002, Richmond et al. 2005). Therefore, clearly 
identifying the motivation for a particular equity objective may help managers determine 
which measurement is most appropriate. For example, if the equity objective has a 
functional value by influencing stakeholder behavior, an inappropriate objective measure 
would lead to misleading evaluations and poor management decisions. 
 
5. Limitations and future directions 
This study looked at equity and behavior in 5 different municipalities in one region 
of the world. Our approach is a starting point for further integrating social dimensions into 
natural resource management.  One productive way to expand on this research would be to 
first investigate how well different types of objective and subjective measures of equity 
align. There is also enormous potential to expand this research to other communities facing 
resource management decisions. Most importantly, managers may use this approach to 
guide their decision-making processes, rather than as a research question.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Simply including “equity” in conservation is too limited a perspective, especially 
when equity and conservation outcome are interlinked. Managers may focus on input or 
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outcome equities, fair or equal inputs and/or outcome, and how they are going to measure 
equity. The implications of targeting the wrong types of equity may result in less 
stakeholder cooperation and unsuccessful conservation. In the absence of clear theoretical 
guidance, managers need empirical evidence to help make these decisions. We offer a 
unique approach to investigating equity that is applicable to a much wider range of settings 
where equity may have strategic importance. It provides a framework that managers can use 
to make better decisions with likely better outcomes. This work also contributes to a 
growing body of interdisciplinary research both advocating for social equity (Schreckenber 
et al. 2016) and investigating its role in facilitating (or impeding) desirable outcomes in 
environmental governance (Halpern et al. 2013, Klein et al. 2015, Franks et al. 2016, Brown 
et al. 2017). 
We provide empirical insight into how managers may use this framework in one 
specific context. We have shown that how fishers in Tañon Strait perceive the rules 
influences how they cooperate, suggesting that these communities would fare better to adopt 
contextually fair management plans. Our research suggests that equity is context dependent, 
and best measured in subjective terms. What stakeholders perceive to be real may have huge 
implications for if/how the conservation intervention is implemented and how successful it 
ultimately is. If perceptions and reality differ, there can be roadblocks for policy change and 
management success (even if people would be benefiting more or less than they think). 
Furthermore, before conservation tradeoffs can accurately be considered, researchers and 
resource managers must have a better understanding of what types of equity are contextually 
relevant and how to measure them.  
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SUPPLEMENTAL  MATERIAL 
1. Demographic information 
Variable Value 
Age Average = 45.66 years 
Sex Male = 222, Female =28 
Alegria 64 
Badian 39 
Ginatilan 37 
Santander 25 
Samboan 36 
Other 3 
Income dependence on 
marine resources 
Mean = 2.25, Median = 2 (1 = 
All, 2 = Some, 3 = A little) 
Std. Deviation = 0.86 
Subsistence dependence 
on marine resources 
Mean = 2.16, Median = 2 (1 = 
All, 2 = Some, 3 = A little) 
Std. Deviation = 0.86 
SM Table 1 Participant demographic information. Note that some questions were not answered so the 
total number does not equal 250 people. 
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SM Figure 1 Distribution of participants’ age, estimated weekly income, subsistence dependence on marine 
resources, and livelihood dependence on marine resources.  
 
2. Mediation analysis   
Mediation is a hypothesized causal chain in which one variable affects a second variable that, in turn, affects 
a third variable. The intervening variable, M, is the mediator. It “mediates” the relationship between a 
predictor, X, and an outcome. Graphically, mediation can be depicted in the following way:  
 
 
 
Paths a and b are called direct effects. The mediational effect, in which X leads to Y through M, is called the 
indirect effect. The indirect effect represents the portion of the relationship between X and Y that is mediated 
by M.  
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We performed a mediation analysis to determine if treatment had any relationship on 
survey responses. We used a classical mediation approach (Baron and Kenny 1986) which 
estimates the effect of the intervention on the mediator, of the mediator on the outcome, and 
of the intervention on the outcome when controlling for the mediator (Coffman 2011), using 
a regression analysis procedure to test for mediation (MacKinnon et al. 2007). We followed 
Baron and Kenny (1986) steps for mediation, and use diagram below to visually represent 
our analysis (note that c' is called a direct effect).  
The standard regression approach to mediation analysis assumes sequential 
ignorability of the mediator, meaning that equity is effectively randomly assigned given 
baseline covariates and the randomized treatment. We used independent covariates in our 
mediation analysis regressions and are satisfied that there is nothing about the game’s 
treatment conditions that would affect participant’s perceived equity of their day-to-day 
lives. Specifically, we used Age, Sex and Municipality.   
 
Analysis Equation Result 
Step 1  Conduct a simple regression analysis 
with X predicting Y to test for path c 
alone 
Y = B01 + B11X + e Yes – When we regress the dependent 
variable (play) on the independent 
variable (treatment) to confirm that the 
independent variable is a significant 
predictor of the dependent variable there 
is a significant interaction.  
Step 2  Conduct a simple regression analysis 
with X predicting M to test for path a 
M = B02 + B12X + e Yes – Perceived Wellbeing, Overall 
Equality, Overall Fairness, Fair Access, 
Fair Financial, Fair Participation, and 
Fair Rules are significant.  
No – Relative Access, Relative Financial, 
Relative Participation are not 
significant.  
Step 3  Conduct a simple regression analysis 
with M predicting Y to test the 
significance of path b alone 
Y = B03 + B13M + e 
 
Yes – Fair Rules is significant.  
No – Perceived Wellbeing, Overall 
Equality, Overall Fairness, Fair Access, 
Fair Financial, Fair Participation, and 
Relative Access, Relative Financial, 
Relative Participation are not 
significant. 
Step 4 If significant in Steps 2 and 3, then 
compare c and c' to give mediation 
effect 
Mediation effect = c - c' The mediation effect is:  
Treatment B: = 0.147 
Treatment C: -3.949 
Treatment D: = -2.791  
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SM Figure 2 Mediation effect of how fair the rules of the game were perceived on player’s harvest. 
 
3. Results including participants who did not show full understanding of the game rules.  
 
 Compliance Regression Results  
 Dependent Variable:   
 Compliance  
 (1) (2) (3)  
Fair Game Rule -0.553 (8.992e-05 ***) -0.372 (0.000 ***) -0.370 (2.27e-05 ***) 
Perceived Wellbeing -0.042 (0.767)   
Overall Fairness -0.138 (0.331)   
Overall Equality -0.129 (0.322)   
Financial Fairness 0.254 (0.128 .) 0.002 (0.980)  
Access Fairness -0.162 (0.316)   
Participation Fairness 0.054 (0.629)   
Less Financial Benefits  0.329 (0.472)   
The Same Financial Benefits -0.442 (0.376)   
More Financial Benefits -0.407 (0.680)   
A Lot More Financial 
Benefits -1.252 (0.121)  
 
Less Participation  0.097 (0.841)   
The Same Participation  0.160 (0.781)   
More Participation  -0.036 (0.389)   
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A Lot More Participation  1.056 (0.108)   
Less Access  1.056 (0.108480) 0.653 (0.168) 0.656 (0.1563) 
The Same Access  1.665 (0.002 **) 0.954 (0.007 **) 0.909 (0.012 *) 
More Access  1.889 (0.012 *) 0.843 (0.051  .) 0.838 (0.056 .) 
A Lot More Access  3.137 (0.002 **) 1.026 (0.040 *) 1.003 (0.038 *) 
Income Dependence -0.240 (0.352)   
Subsistence Dependence -0.051 (0.819)   
Age 0.015 (0.357)   
Sex 1.066 (0.016 *) 0.961 (0.009 **) 1.000 (0.010 **) 
Constant 1.2745(0.408) 1.092 (0.0131 *) 1.090 (0.008 **) 
  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 320.4 413.15 428.13  
  
 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
SM Table 2A Compliance results with all participants regardless of understanding. 
  
 
 76 
 
 
Punishment Regression Results 
 Dependent variable:  
 Punishment  
 (1)  (2)  
Fair Game Rules -0.602 (0.003 **) -0.538 (0.002 **) 
Perceived Wellbeing 0.172 (0.425)  
Overall Fairness -2.120 (0.186)  
Overall Equality -0.802 (0.000 ***) -0.758 (2.150e-05 ***) 
Financial Fairness 0.422 (0.060 .)  0.404 (0.061 .) 
Access Fairness -0.963 (0.000 ***) -0.894 (4.394e-05 ***) 
Participation Fairness -0.931 (2.897e-06 ***) -0.951 (1.280e-06 ***) 
Less Financial Benefits  -0.200 (0.645) -0.192 (0.649) 
The Same Financial Benefits -0.998 (0.040 *) -0.977 (0.050 *) 
More Financial Benefits 18.568 (< 2.2e-16 ***) 18.927 (< 2.2e-16 ***) 
A Lot More Financial Benefits -1.317 (0.351)  -1.405 (0.286) 
Less Participation  2.196 (0.000 ***) 2.172 (0.000 ***) 
The Same Participation  0.697 (0.254)  0.756 (0.205) 
More Participation  1.867 (0.002 **)  1.762 (0.003 **) 
A Lot More Participation  -0.448 (0.756) -0.234 (0.864) 
Less Access  3.137 (0.000 ***) 3.194 (0.000 ***) 
The Same Access  1.572 (0.014 *)  1.444 (0.032 *) 
More Access  1.748 (0.023 *)  1.603 (0.043 *) 
A Lot More Access -1.924 (0.220)  -1.639 (0.198) 
Income Dependence 1.075 (0.015 *) 1.071 (0.003 **) 
Subsistence Dependence -1.219 (0.005 **)  -1.300 (0.001 ***) 
Age 0.05244 (0.009 **) 0.048 (0.006 **) 
Sex -2.0956 (1.392e-05 ***) -2.032 (6.255e-06 ***) 
Constant 3.692 (0.0755) 3.581 (0.0785 .) 
Akaike Inf. Crit.  244.67 242.36 
Note:  p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01  
 
SM Table 2B Punishment results with all participants regardless of understanding. 
 
 
4. Multicollinearity  
We use variance inflation factors (VIFs) as a measure of the amount of multicollinearity in our survey 
variables. A VIF is the ratio of variance in a model with multiple terms, divided by the variance of a model 
with one term alone. It quantifies the severity of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. VIFs over 10 indicate collinear variables (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter 2004).  
  
 
 77 
 
 
 
VIF Compliance Models 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Fair Game Rules 1.643  1.216 1.060 
Perceived 
Wellbeing  1.797  
  
Overall Fairness  2.138    
Overall Equality  1.575   
Fair Financial  1.978  1.170  
Fair Access  2.139    
Fair Participation  1.338    
            Relative 
Financial  6.998  
  
Relative 
Participation  4.117  
  
Relative Access  5.965  1.088 1.070 
Income  1.659    
Subsistence  1.829    
Age  1.451    
Sex  1.264  1.019 1.010 
 
 
VIF Punish Models 
 (1) (2) 
Fair Game Rules 2.137 1.845 
Perceived Wellbeing  2.330  
Overall Fairness  2.027  
Overall Equality  2.089 1.611 
Fair Financial  2.418 2.273 
Fair Access  3.237 2.643 
Fair Participation  2.136 2.097 
Relative Financial  3.072 2.805 
Relative Participation  3.715 3.112 
Relative Access  6.683 5.054 
Income  2.703 2.317 
Subsistence  2.339 2.137 
Age  1.610 1.512 
Sex  1.392 1.351 
 
 
VIF Punish Models 
 (1) (2) 
Fair Game Rules 2.452  
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Perceived Wellbeing  3.100  
Overall Fairness  2.930  
Overall Equality  2.601  
Fair Financial  1.966  
Fair Access  4.568 1.683 
Fair Participation  3.333 1.594 
Relative Financial  7.651  
Relative Participation  12.052 1.615 
Relative Access  31.162 2.291 
Income  3.801 2.317 
Subsistence  3.186 1.148 
Age  2.016 1.231 
Sex  1.513 1.299 
SM Table 3 Compliance and Punishment Variance Inflation Factors.  
 
5.  Cluster analysis 
 
 
SM Figure 3 Cluster analysis plot showing 8 clusters 
of equity and demographics. From the cluster analysis 
we determined that there were no significant clusters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SM Figure 4 Cluster analysis plot showing 8 clusters 
of different types of equity. From the cluster analysis 
we determined that there were no significant clusters. 
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Summary 
Successful natural resource management requires users comply with the prescribed 
regulations and often to punish those who break the regulations. Not surprisingly, natural 
resource management increasingly turns towards interventions that incentivize a defined 
group of users to participate in these cooperative behaviors so that they may see the rewards. 
Many arrangements rely on an existing group of users to take collective ownership over 
resources. An alternative model has emerged in a limited number of situations where a 
group of people self assemble and apply for ownership, raising the question of how the 
process of group formation affects the performance of natural resource management. We 
investigate if self-assembled or assigned groups cooperate more using a framed field 
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experiment with participants from artisanal fishing communities in Tañon Strait, Philippines 
that are undergoing management changes. When there are costs to groups for being 
assigned, we explore whether promoting face-to-face communication among group 
members can offset some of these costs. We show that self-assembly and the ability to 
communicate face-to-face both increase compliance with rules and punishment of defectors, 
although self-assembly has a greater effect. Given the increased awareness of local agency 
in conservation decision-making, self-assembly may facilitate cooperation among 
stakeholders and thereby foster more sustainable resource management.  
 
1. Introduction 
A general challenge in the management of resources that provide multiple users 
social and economic benefits is how to get individuals to cooperate and prevent over-
exploitation of a common pool resource (Ostrom 1990). Common pool resources (CPR) are 
potentially subject to over-exploitation, depletion or degradation because the core resource 
(e.g., fish stock) is limited in quantity and it is challenging to limit the number of people 
who benefit from them (Ostrom, Walker & Gardener 1994). The challenge of collectively 
managing a CPR sustainably is fundamental to a variety of problems where the narrow 
interests of individuals are in conflict with the broader interests of the collective.  
Two cooperative behaviors critically important for successful CPR management are 
compliance and punishment. Compliance is reflected by how much a person harvests when 
there are pro-social and anti-social options. Successful resource management almost always 
requires participants comply with the prescribed harvest amount, which is one potential 
reason why it is often used to define successful participant behavior, or cooperation. 
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Punishment may be very important for management success as well, although studies of 
punishment in the natural resource management literature are sparse. This may be because 
punishment is a taboo subject in some communities or is difficult to monitor. Regardless, 
most community-based conservation interventions require professional, community and/or 
self-punishment to enforce punishment on those who violate the regulations.   
Local context together with management decisions likely determines which aspects 
of cooperation behaviors are most relevant and feasible. The manner in which cooperative 
behaviors are encouraged and enabled in CPRs becomes particularly relevant with the 
increasingly popular management strategy of rights-based approaches, where specific 
harvest or access rights are granted to individuals or groups such as cooperatives or fisher 
organizations (DFID 2000). For example, harvest rights, or “catch shares,” may be allocated 
as a fraction of the allowable catch to incentivize fishers to both harvest the resource 
sustainably (Fujita et al. 1998) and punish defectors (Costello et al. 2010).  
Another rights-based approach in small-scale fisheries is Territorial Use Rights 
Fisheries (TURFs), which provides a well-defined user group of fishers exclusive rights to 
an area of the ocean. The majority of TURFs are established by conforming to the existing 
power and resource dynamics by giving existing users governance and access rights to the 
resource (Twohey et al. In review). Conforming to historical patterns of catch is also 
characteristic of the allocation of initial quotas in many catch shares. An alternative 
implementation model has only been used in a limited number of situations (e.g., Chile) 
where groups self-assemble and apply for a TURF. This approach is believed to further 
empower fisher organizations (Gallardo Fernandez and Friman 2011).  
This variation in how groups are formed motivates understanding the consequences 
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of group formation on its members’ willingness to participate in cooperative behaviors. A 
variety of lessons learned from broader social sciences, including behavioral economics, 
human behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology gives insights into why group 
formation ultimately influences cooperation. First, group formation likely influences social 
(or group identify), which increases cooperation (Turner 1982, 1984). Social identification 
is the perception of oneness within a group of persons (Ashford and Mael 1989). It is a 
cognitive construct and is associated with loyalty to, and pride in, the group and its activities 
(Turner 1982, Turner 1984, Tajfel and Turners 1985). Having a strong social identity 
reduces people’s tendency to free ride on others’ cooperation (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 
Turner et al. 1987). People with strong social identity still seek to avoid being ‘suckered’ 
(Simpson 2006), so exercise the ability to punish. Social identity also enhances perceptions 
of trust among group members (Kramer and Goldman 1995), where then group members 
expect others group members will reciprocate their efforts (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; 
Yamagishi, 1986). There also exists a synergy between social identify and social norms 
(Turner 1991). Social norms may be defined as regularities in attitudes and behavior that 
characterize a social group and differentiate it from other social groups (Hogg and Reid 
2006). Similar to social identity, social norms play an enormous role influencing 
cooperative behavior (Herrman et al. 2008, Fehr and Gatcher 2002). Research shows people 
are more willing to comply and punish when there are strong social norms (Herrman et al. 
2008), and evidence suggests negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate 
mechanism behind altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gatcher 2002). Finally, how a group is 
formed is also likely to influence its member’s sense of agency. Evolutionary psychology 
research predicts that the presence of choice influences people’s behavior (Bandura 2006), 
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and experimental economic research suggests democratic institutions may affect cooperation 
(Bardhan 2000), especially compared to policies that were exogenously imposed (Dal Bo et 
al. 2010).  
Forming, or defining, a group is relatively easy in experimental lab settings, but 
often difficult in applied settings. Indeed, defining the “community” for a conservation 
intervention presents many obstacles and is often one of the initial challenges facing 
decision-makers. It remains unclear if the insights from studies of group dynamics will 
materially affect cooperation in a group that manages natural resources. Here we build off 
these past findings and apply them in the context of CPR management, where the presence 
of choice may be facilitated or constrained by the community’s political context. 
Specifically, we ask if self-assembled groups of stakeholders cooperate more than assigned 
groups. Given the evidence that how a group is formed likely influences its member’s sense 
of group identity and its social norms, we predict that group formation will influence its 
members’ cooperation. 
In cases where self-assembly proves to provide distinct cooperation benefits, we then 
have to consider real world situations where self-assembly is not a viable option (perhaps 
due to political or geographic constraints) but where cooperation is required for successful 
management. For example, Chilean TURFs are quite small (few hundred hectares), which 
allows for many self-assembled TURFs in the vicinity of a single community. However, if 
TURFs need to be relatively large for more mobile species, the opportunities to subdivide an 
area are more limited, which makes self-assembly less viable.  
For such constrained settings, we also explore whether there are options to reduce 
the lost benefits of cooperation through other means. One possibility is increasing 
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communication within the group to counter the challenges of assigned group membership. 
Enhanced communication within the group has been shown to increase cooperation in other 
settings (Ostrom et al. 1994, Messick and Brewer 1983, Sally 1995, Brandts et al. 2015, 
Abatayo and Lynham 2016), and management actions commonly encourage communication 
between stakeholders through participation in working groups and meetings. Specifically, 
face-to-face communication (also known as “cheap talk”) has been shown to increase 
cooperation in lab settings (Isaac and Walker 1988). In a real-world setting, face-to-face 
communication allows for nonbinding announcements of possible harvest and commitment 
to punishment that might improve the efficiency of compliance by allowing people to 
convey the threat of punishment to potential over harvesters. We explore the role of 
communication in CPR management by investigating if face-to-face communication does 
indeed increase cooperation.  
We use experimental play, called “Common Pool Resource Games,” and a survey to 
address our research questions and empirically test if the mechanisms of group formation 
and face-to-face communication influence compliance and punishment. We show that self-
assembly and the ability to communicate face-to-face both increase compliance with rules 
and punishment of defectors, although self-assembly has a greater effect.  
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Research setting 
This research is linked to a large international project called Fish Forever that is 
focused on implementing TURFs to enhance the management success in small-scale 
artisanal fisheries. Small-scale fisheries are challenged by multiple issues. In particular, 
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coordination challenges lead to overfishing (Costello et al. 2012), destructive fishing 
practices (McClanhan et al. 2009), environmental degradation, inadequate funding and lack 
of government support, which often results in weak governance (Berkes et al. 2001). TURFs 
are widely believed to incentivize cooperation and sustainable fisheries (Fujita et al. 1998, 
Costello et al. 2010) and are being implemented in a variety of settings, including Tañon 
Strait in the Philippines.  
Tañon Strait is home to roughly 2.1 million people (NSO 2010) who depend on its 
marine resources for food and livelihood. It is one of the region’s major fishing grounds and 
supports at least 26,850 fishers (Green et al. 2004). The fishers in Tañon Strait use a variety 
of fishing gear, including gillnets, hook-and line, squid jigs, and beach seines, which despite 
being illegal, are tolerated. The nearshore reefs are highly diverse, including species from 
over 24 families (Carpenter 2005). Fishers target nearshore commercially valuable species 
including triggerfish, sweetlips, emperors, snappers, solider fish, and goatfish, as well as 
pelagic species including anchovies, billfish, mackerels and tuna.  
Tañon Strait became a protected seascape in 1988 because of its high biodiversity. It 
spans three Provinces in two regions – Cebu, Negros Oriental and Negros Occidental – and 
is considered the largest protected seascape and protected area in the Philippines. The Tañon 
Strait Protected Seascape – General Management Plan (TSPS-GMP) envisions “a Protected 
Seascape with natural biodiversity and integrity, which is effectively managed by all 
stakeholders to ensure ecological integrity and resilience, sustainable socio-economic 
development and communities living in harmony with nature” (TSPS-GMP). Prior to TSPS-
GMP, nearshore fisheries have been open access, meaning there were no restricted users, 
access restrictions, quota, or maximum allowable catch. Community members are not 
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responsible for complying with, enforcing or punishing fishing regulations. TSPS-GMP will 
implement three types of zones designating different levels of resource use, including 
TURFs.  
With the introduction of TURFs and changing fisheries management, fishers will be 
asked to comply with new regulations including physical access to fishing grounds and 
catch allocations. It is unclear how fishers will comply with new regulations that change 
their access to fishing grounds and require new behaviors.  Some managers believe fishers 
are generally law-abiding and will comply. Others believe fishers say they will comply but 
will not. Fishers will also be expected to report those who do not comply (which will lead to 
the perpetrator being punished). In Tañon Strait, reporting may be costly and impose risk of 
social retaliation. For example, a fisher who reported another community member using 
illegal gear was blacklisted from selling his catch to a local restaurant in adjacent areas 
where regulations have been implemented (personal conversation). There are also incidents 
of boats being tampered with after their owners report violations. Thus, this potential cost 
forces fisheries managers to look for ways to encourage and incentivize punishment.  
 
2.2 Participants 
In total, our study includes 232 fishers from 5 different municipalities on the island 
of Cebu – Alegria, Sanboan, Santander, Ginatilan, and Badian. Participant characteristics – 
such as age, sex, number of dependents – were balanced between treatments (see 
Supplemental Materials). Two potential sources of bias exist and must be considered when 
evaluating external validity. First, participation was voluntary and participants were 
recruited by Fish Forever partners on the sole basis of them being artisanal fishers. Results 
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could reflect participation of more community-oriented participants or those that are more 
comfortable with Fish Forever. Second, these 5 local communities are preparing for a 
management change, resulting in participants being more attune to sustainable management 
practices and cooperative behavior.  
 
2.3 The Common Pool Resource Game 
In a Common Pool Resource Game, players must weigh the individual versus group 
benefit when deciding how much of a common pool resource to harvest. Such games build 
upon traditional economics models to inform the development of resource management 
mechanisms that influence stakeholder behavior (Ostrom et al. 1994, Cardenas and Ostrom 
2004, Busurto et al. 2016), but differ in that they are often conducted in the field (rather 
than in a lab at a university). These “lab-in-field” experiments better facilitate the complex 
set of motivations that drive behavior (OECD 2012) and benefit from subjects that are more 
familiar with the problems (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008) compared to most experimental 
studies conducted with college students from distant settings.  
We use a specific game known as a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game because it 
provides a simple measurement of relevant cooperation that is easiest to execute in the field 
(Janssen 2008). This approach presents the ideal opportunity to test and refine theory about 
the conditions that encourage cooperation in a context that is relevant to natural resource 
managers because participants, i.e. artisanal fishers, share a natural resource, i.e. an artisanal 
fishery, and “play” a real CPR game in their daily lives. In particular, it presents the 
opportunity to study how unrelated people, i.e., exogenously imposed groups of fishers from 
the community, cooperate in a given context that abstractly represents the real-world 
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challenges of a fishing community overcoming mutual defection, or over harvesting. Both 
fishing and punishment in Tañon Strait are often solo activities, and individuals have to 
make daily decisions regarding harvest and punishment within the community’s social 
norms. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game applies to natural resource management scenarios 
where two people both use a common pool resource (e.g., they are fishing in a community 
pond). There are no fishing regulations, or rules, as to how many fish one person can 
choose. In this example choosing 6 fish means a fisher complies with pro-social behavior 
and cultural norms to harvest the sustainable amount (6 fish each, 12 fish in total). Their 
choice is kept private from their partner, and everyone benefits equally when all fishers 
harvest the socially acceptable amount of fish. However, when certain individuals harvest 
more, these increases come at a cost to others. In the real world, such costs could arise from 
fewer fish to catch or deflated market prices. This reflects real world conditions in many 
artisanal fishing communities where fishers have to decide how many fish to harvest 
knowing that it is an open access common pool resource, that there is a culturally acceptable 
number of fish to harvest, but that they can gain more individually in the short term by 
overharvesting.  
If both fishers harvest the norm, then they both get to keep six fish and a healthy fish 
stock will be maintained. If one fisher complies with the norm but the other defects and 
harvests more than the norm (10 fish), then the defector gets to keep all of his catch, 
whereas his partner gets a much smaller catch (two fish as opposed to 6 fish) because there 
are not enough fish to sustainably harvest 16 fish. If both fishers defect (10 fish each, 20 
fish in total, called mutual defection), each player will only receive 1 fish. Both fishers have 
the same opportunities and know the consequences of each action.  
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This is considered to be a simultaneous game, because the fishers cannot 
communicate and will make their decision at the same time. Table 1 shows the payoff 
structure for this classic Prisoner’s Dilemma game. To determine what each fisher will do, 
they will each analyze their best strategy given the other fisher’s possible strategies. If fisher 
2 overharvests (defects), fisher 1 will get either 1 or 2, and if fisher 2 complies with the 
social norm, fisher 1 will get either 6 or 10. Fisher 1 must choose his best strategy given that 
he does not know how fisher 2 will respond. The rational thing for fisher 1 to do purely 
from self-interest is to defect, since he will individually be better off under either options 
chosen by fisher 2. Similarly, analyzing the best strategy for fisher 2 with regards to fisher 
1’s strategies gets us to the same point: the individually rational thing to do for fisher 2 to 
do is to defect, making mutual defection the dominant strategy even though both fishers 
would be far better off if they had cooperated and both complied. The Nash equilibrium in 
this game (denoted in Table 1 with an asterix) is the set of strategies that maximizes each 
fisher’s payout (or utility) given the other fisher’s strategy. Mutual defection in the real 
world with respect to natural resources leads to over exploitation of the natural resource, and 
in the case of fish, failed fisheries stocks. Overcoming this defection dilemma requires 
coordination and mutual compliance.  
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Table 1 Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game where payouts are defined as 10 > 6 > 2> 1 and where 2*6 > 1 
+10. * Denotes pure Nash equilibrium.  The Prisoner's Dilemma game presents the problem of how to escape 
from the inefficient stable equilibrium, e.g. Nash equilibrium, of mutual defection. 
 
Our experimental one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game presented a scenario similar to 
the example above, but with one major addition – punishment. Prior to playing the game 
and before they know who their partner is, players answer the following question that pre-
commits them to altruistic punishment for all three rounds: If your partner defects by 
choosing 10 fish, you can punish them by taking away 5 of their fish (they will be left with 
5 fish) but it will cost you one fish. Would you like to punish them? This reflects real 
choices fishers in Tañon Strait will have to make about reporting fishing violations where 
there is often social pressure not to report and punish community members who defect, and 
fishers who report defectors often experience threats and negative social ramifications.  
In our experimental design, punishing a defector may be irrational. However, people 
are more likely to punish when they have a strong negative emotion towards defectors (Fehr 
and Gatcher 2002). The willingness for someone to punish another who violates a norm at a 
personal cost and without obtaining any personal benefit is known as “altruistic 
punishment” or “strong reciprocity”. In this case, punishment is altruistic because the 
outcome is fixed from one round, meaning that the benefits of punishing on future 
 
Fisher 1 
Fisher 2 
 Comply (6 fish) 
Defect 
(10 fish) 
Comply 
(6 fish) 6, 6 1, 10 
Defect 
(10 fish) 10, 1 2, 2* 
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cooperation are not experienced in the punisher’s payout. Altruistic punishment has been 
argued to maintain and even enforce cooperative group norms (Fehr et al. 2008, Fehr and 
Gatcher 2002) suggesting that a rational player who believes altruistic punishment is 
possible will be more likely to comply.  
We designed our experiment to force players to make the decision to punish (or not) 
simply based on their knowledge of their treatment, or game conditions, without the 
opportunity to evaluate their partner’s potential for cooperating or defecting behavior. This 
was done strategically to isolate the initial effects of group membership from other 
dynamics that could influence the likelihoods of cooperation and punishment as the game 
evolves. The simplicity of a one-shot game allows us to look at the general sentiment, or 
social norms, towards punishment among fishers in Tañon Strait, because we can investigate 
willingness to comply and punish independent of previous play (thus eliminating 
compliance and punishment based on retaliation) and with no future commitment of 
cooperative behavior (thus eliminating punishment for the sake of future earnings). Our one-
shot design eliminates any kind of reputation formation so that purely selfish people will 
never cooperate or punish others, because cooperation and punishment are costly and yield 
no pecuniary benefits (Lotem et al. 1999), thereby heightening the incentive to defect and 
highlighting the potential power of the treatment to overcome selfish incentives. In other 
words, in repeated games punishment might have confounding effects on cooperation 
through reputation building, but defection is preserved as the dominant action in a one-shot 
game. We can assume that treatment conditions were ultimately responsible for players’ 
behavior, because social identity and social norms were not able to evolve through repeated 
interactions.  The limitation of a one-shot game is that players do not learn and adapt their 
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behaviors through repeated interactions (Embrey et al. 2017) like they would in the real 
world. This game is not meant to investigate the myriad of other aspects of group dynamics 
that could affect fishery performance, such as the evolution of leadership, reputation, 
reciprocity, or costly signaling that would be investigated through a game with repeated 
interactions and where players would learn and adjust their play.  
Player 
1 
Player 2 
 P, C (4/5, 1) 
N, C 
(1/5, 1) 
P, D 
(4/5, 0) 
N, D 
(1/5, 0) 
P, C 
(4/5, 1) 6, 6* 6, 6 0, 5 0, 5 
N, C 
(1/5, 1) 6, 6 6, 6 1, 10* 1, 10 
P, D 
(4/5, 0) 
5, 0 
 10, 1* -4, -4 1, -3 
N, D 
(1/5, 0) 5, 0 10, 1 -3, 1 2, 2* 
Table 2 Prisoner’s Dilemma payout bi-matrix with opportunity to altruistically punish. Strategies are 
represented as follows: P= Punish, N = No punish, C = Comply, D = Defect. Each strategy has a probability 
of being played, shown in parentheses. Underlined numbers denote player’s best response and * denotes pure 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
The payoff structure for this Prisoner’s Dilemma game is shown in the bi-matrix 
presented in Table 2. The experimental design is presented in Table 3. Participants were 
randomly assigned to four different treatments in which we manipulated how groups are 
formed and their ability to communicate. The four treatments are described in Table 3.  
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Treatment Conditions Sample size 
(I, Control) 
Randomly assigned 
group with no 
communication 
Players are randomly assigned a partner, and players are not 
allowed to communicate 56 
(II) Randomly 
assigned group 
with 
communication 
Players are randomly assigned a partner, and players get to 
communicate with their partner for 5 minutes before they play 63 
(III) Self-
Assembled 
Players have two minutes to choose their partner from others in 
the same treatment after they are told they are playing a 
cooperation game but before they know the rules. Players may 
communicate while pairing off but not during play 
55 
(IV) Self-
Assembled + 
Additional 
Communication 
Players have two minutes to choose their partner from others in 
the same treatment after they are told they are playing a 
cooperation game, but before they know the rules. Players get to 
communicate with their partner for 5 minutes before they play 
58 
Total 232 
Table 3 Experiment treatments. 
 
We intended to have 64 individuals (32 pairs) per Treatment I and 62 individuals (31 
pairs) per Treatments II, III, and IV. However, we modified our design to reflect participant 
turn out – each treatment ultimately had between 55 and 63 individuals. Treatments I and IV 
had an odd number of participants, meaning that a different participant sat out each round. 
In Treatment I, the partner to the missing participant sat out. In Treatment IV, we randomly 
selected a number each round and the corresponding participant sat out.  
Each participant received 500PhP (~USD10) for participating and had the 
opportunity to earn an additional 50 to 500PhP (~USD1-10) depending on his/her actual 
payout from one randomly selected round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This payout 
amount reflects the real-world opportunity costs of one day’s worth of fishing for the 
participants. Likewise, the punishment cost reflects the real-world risk associated with 
retaliation against the punisher and of breaking social norms. The payout was randomly 
selected from one of the three rounds to ensure players did not face repercussions from their 
play outside of game in the real world. The payout was not revealed until after participants 
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completed the games and the surveys, so there was no opportunity to learn and adapt their 
behavior. 
To summarize, the order of events went as follows: 
1. Participants were randomly assigned to treatments.  
2. Treatments were separated. All participants within a treatment played the game at the 
same time, and each of the four treatments played at separate times.  
3. Treatment conditions and game rules were explained in multiple formats.  
4. Participants committed (or not) to punishing their partners if they harvested 10 fish. 
Note that this commitment holds for all three partners and rounds.  
5. Participants paired off according to treatment conditions. Self-assembled treatments 
were allowed to communicate during the pairing off process because this best reflects 
real group selection processes in which participants communicate about the common 
pool resource. Note that even self-assembled with no communication treatments were 
allowed to communicate during this pairing process and we were unable to prevent 
communication about strategies. Random treatments were assigned based on partner 
identification numbers.  
6. Communication treatments were allowed to communicate in the form of in-person open 
communication, meaning there are no limits to what players can discuss, including the 
game (also referred to as “open chat” by Cooper et al. 2014).  
7. Each participant secretly harvested 6 or 10 fish.  
8. Repeat pairing and harvest process (steps 5-7) twice more so that each participant played 
three rounds, each round with a different partner. 
9. Participants completed a post-game survey.  
10. Payouts received their payouts.  
 
2.4 Nash equilibrium 
Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields both players’ most rational strategy (or 
strategies). In solving for equilibria we are also able to calculate the frequency and expected 
payout of each strategy. Figure 1 is a game tree that represents the two points in the game 
where players have to simultaneously decide to punish or not, and to comply (6 fish) or 
defect (10 fish). Working from the last node backwards Player 2 has to choose to comply or 
defect; that is, Player 2 has to choose a harvest of 10 or 6. If Player 1 anticipates that Player 
2 is a rational player, Player 1 would harvest the maximum amount of fish (10) to maximize 
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the expected return. If Player 1 chose to punish, his payoff will be 1 fish. Likewise, if he did 
not punish, his payoff will be 0 fish. In the scenario where Player 2 plays punish and defect, 
expressed as PD, Player 1’s best response is to not punish and comply (NC). The resulting 
payout would be 10 fish for Player 2, and 1 fish for Player 1, expressed (1, 10). Now 
consider if Player 1 also defects by harvesting 10 fish, his payout would be -4 or -3 
depending on if he also punished or not. The payouts of -4 or -3 are both less than if he 
complied (0 if he punished as well, or 1 if he did not punish). Thus, when one player 
defects, there is an 
asymmetrical equilibrium, 
because the other player’s 
best response is to not 
punish and comply – thus 
the paired strategy (NC, 
PD) and its inverse (PD, 
NC) are pure Nash 
equilibria.  
 
Figure 1 Game tree representing where players have to make decisions. The first decision both players must 
make is to punish or not for all three rounds. The second decision is to comply or defect. The dashed lines 
mean that both players have the same information and are making their decisions simultaneously.   
 
Following the same logic, if one player does not punish and defects (ND), that 
player will get 5, 10, -3 or 2 depending on how the other plays. The first player’s best 
response is to also not punish and defect (ND). The resulting payout would be 2 fish for 
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each player (2, 2) and the paired strategy (ND, ND) is also a pure Nash equilibrium. Lastly, 
if one player punishes and complies (PC) the other player’s best response is to punish and 
comply (PC), making (PC, PC) with a payout of (6, 6) the last pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. Thus, there are four pure strategy Nash equilibria: (PC, PC), (PD, NC), (NC, 
PD), and (ND, ND).  
 
2.5 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
In our game there is no certainty that players will play certain strategies. This is 
called a mixed strategy game. In a mixed strategy game the Nash equilibrium is a player’s 
mixed strategy (meaning that probabilities of play may fall between 0 and 1) as a best 
response to the other player’s mixed strategy. For our purposes here, we can consider the 
equilibrium components for the solved mixed strategy summarized in Table 4. For a full 
explanation of the solved mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, see the Supplemental Materials.  
 
Player 1 Player 2 Translation 
σ1PC = 4/5, σ1NC = 
1/5, σ1PD = 0, 
σ1ND = 0 and σ1PC 
= 0, σ1NC = 1, 
σ1PD = 0, σ1ND = 0 
σ2PC = 1, σ2NC =0, 
σ2PD = 0, σ2ND = 
0, and σ2PC = 4/5, 
σ2NC =1/5, σ2PD = 
0, σ2ND = 0. 
Player 1 mixes between one strategy where he has 4/5 probability of 
punishing and complying and 1/5 probability of not punishing and 
complying, and another strategy where he will not punish and 
comply. Player 2 will mix between one strategy that is to punish and 
comply, and another strategy that has the probability of punishing 
and complying at 4/5 and not punishing and complying at 1/5. 
σ1PC = 4/5, σ1NC = 
1/5, σ1PD = 0, 
σ1ND = 0 
σ2PC =0, σ2NC =0, 
σ2PD = 1/5, σ2ND = 
4/5 and σ2PC =0, 
σ2NC =0, σ2PD = 1, 
σ2ND = 0 
Player 1 will punish and comply with the probability of 4/5 and not 
punish and comply with the probability of 1/5, and Player 2 will mix 
between one strategy where he has 1/5 probability of punishing and 
defecting and 4/5 probability of not punishing and defecting, and 
another strategy where he punishes and defects 
σ1PC =0, σ1NC = 1, 
σ1PD = 0, σ1ND = 
0, and σ1PC = 0, 
σ1NC =0, σ1PD = 0, 
σ1ND = 1 
σ2PC = 4/5, σ2NC 
=1/5, σ2PD = 0, 
σ2ND = 0 
Player 1 mixes between two strategies, one where he does not 
punish and complies, and one where he does not punish and defect, 
and Player 2 has 4/5 probability of punishing and complying and 1/5 
probability of not punishing and complying. 
Table 4 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium output from the bimatrix equilibrium algorithm (Avis et al. 
2010). Our game has three complicated equilibrium components. 
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2.6 Precautions  
We took several precautions to ensure people understood the game, including 
presenting the materials in different formats and following up with a post game survey that 
asked two comprehensive multiple-choice questions about the game (see Supplemental 
Material). Our treatments shared similar levels of non-understanding (Assigned + No 
communication = 14.3%, Assigned + Communication =8.3%, Self-assembled + No 
communication =16.4, Self-assembled + Communication =17.5%). We include all responses 
from all players regardless of whether they answered both questions correctly to address 
concerns about “post treatment bias”. Excluding participants who did not show full 
comprehension, however, yielded similar results. We report the results excluding 
participants who did not show full comprehension in the Supplemental Material.  
 
2.7 Analyses 
All of our analyses are designed to investigate the conditions that inspire 
cooperation. Since participants who harvested 6 fish were “cooperators” and those who 
harvested 10 fish were “defectors,” we categorized the data as binomial. We fit two types of 
models to investigate treatment effect on cooperation. First, we looked for treatment’s 
interaction significance by fitting an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. We use an OLS 
model to minimize the sum of the squared residuals. This model clustered responses by 
individuals, because each participant played three rounds and there is a lack of 
independence between observations. Our model also included robust standard errors.  
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Second, we looked at how many rounds individual participants cooperated on 
average using a linear model (LM) where individuals’ behaviors were averaged into one 
data point. Treatment conditions were broken up into the ability to self assemble (or not) 
and additional communication (or not). The main difference between these two methods is 
how treatment and individuals’ behavior are considered.  
The regression analyses do not give any insight into how theoretical behavior 
compares to actual behavior, nor do they identify the conditions that may inspire individual 
or paired cooperation. We therefore also compare how participants play relative to the 
theoretical predictions based on probabilities (Nash Equilibrium predictions) to provide 
additional insight into the circumstances that inspire cooperation and perhaps overcome 
incentives not to.  
Finally, we calculated a participant’s payout (or utility) using probabilities to express 
the uncertainty about what the other player will do (see Supplemental Materials). For 
example, Player 1’s expected utility for the strategy punish and comply may be expressed by 
equation 1: 
EU1(NC) = 6(σ2PC+ σ2NC) + 1(σ2PD+ σ2ND)   (Eq. 1) 
where σ2 represents the probability of Player 2 playing each of the four strategies. Solving 
the expected utility for each strategy then allows us to replace the theoretical probability 
with the actual probability of each strategy being played for each treatment (see 
Supplemental Materials). For example, Player 1’s expected utility for the strategy punish 
and comply in the control treatment may be expressed by solving equation 1 using the 
played probability values:   
EU1(NC) = 6(0.11+ 0.36) + 1(0.16+ 0.37)   (Eq. 2) 
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Comparing the frequencies of individual behavior (and corresponding payoff) to the 
predicted behavior (and payoff) gives insight into when participants deviate from the 
rational strategy that would otherwise give the highest payoff.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Treatment effect  
Self-assembled treatments both comply and punish significantly more than assigned 
treatments (Fig. 2). Both group assembly and the ability to communicate have a positive 
effect on cooperation. However, group assembly has a significantly greater effect than 
communication on both compliance and punishment, and the positive effect of 
communication is not significant (Table 5). Our results were obtained from an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model displayed in Table 5 and a generalized linear model (GLM) displayed 
in Table 6.  
 
Figure 2 Mean rates of A) compliance, and B) Punishment, by treatment with standard errors and 
clustering by individual. AN = Assigned + No communication, AC = Assigned + Communication, SN = Self-
assembled, SC = Self-assembled + Communication.  
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Compliance Punishment 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr (>|t|) Estimate Std. Error t value Pr (>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.541 0.053 10.205 0.000 0.257 0.056 4.638 0.000 
Assigned + 
Communication 0.072 0.064 1.139 0.255 0.102 0.083 1.220 0.222 
Self-Assembly 0.236 0.061 3.886 0.000 0.230 0.084 2.753 0.006 
Self-Assembly 
+ 
Communication 
0.298 0.060 4.989 0.000 0.338 0.084 4.013 0.000 
 p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 
Table 5 Treatment effect on cooperation with an ordinary least squares model including clustering and 
robust standard errors. Note that significance is relative to the baseline. 
 
Compliance Punishment 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr (>|t|) Estimate Std. Error t value Pr (>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.545 0.041 13.409 < 2e-16 0.254 0.060 4.188 3.95e-05 
Assembly 0.237 0.057 4.157 4.48e-05 0.230 0.085 2.697 0.008 
Communication 0.052 0.058 0.898 0.379 0.119 0.087 1.364 0.174 
Assembly: 
Communication 0.011 0.082 0.128 0.898 0.000 0.123 0.001 0.999 
 p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 
Table 6 Effect of communication and assembly on individual cooperation with a generalized linear 
model where individuals’ behaviors were averaged into one data point. 
 
3.2 Cooperation 
Participants generally comply with rules (54% of people in baseline treatment 
comply). When we look at the baseline individual compliance, we find that individuals 
comply on average 1.8 times over the three rounds (Table 6). Participants are generally not 
willing to punish defectors (25.7% of people in baseline treatment are willing to punish). 
The lack of punishment in the baseline conditions suggests that in a one-shot game people 
are reluctant to waste the resources on punishment, likely because they either expect people 
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to generally comply or because they will not see the rewards from punishing through others’ 
compliant behavior until future iterations of the game.  
Self-assembly has a significantly large positive effect on compliance (Table 5, 
increases compliance by 23.6%, p < 0.0001). Communication has a non-significant positive 
effect (Table 5, increases compliance by 7.2%, p = 0.255). When we look at the average 
responses of individuals across the three rounds, we similarly see that self-assembly has a 
significantly positive effect on compliance (Table 6). Self-assembly also has a significantly 
large positive effect on punishment (increase of 23%, p = 0.006), whereas communication 
again only has a non-significant marginally positive effect (increase of 10.2%, p = 0.222). 
Similarly, analyzing the average responses of individuals across rounds suggests that self-
assembly has a significant 25.4% positive effect on punishment (Table 6).  
 
3.3 Paired behaviors 
The most common paired behavior in the self-assembled with additional 
communication treatment is for both players to punish and comply (Fig. 3, PC, PC). As 
demonstrated in the solved utility values for each behavior (see Supplemental Materials), 
this equilibrium (PC, PC) occurs when neither player can do better than punish and comply 
when the other player plays punish and comply, and only holds when the probability of the 
other player defecting is zero. This would suggest that players in this treatment strongly 
believe, likely due to the self-assembly process and ability to communicate, that the 
probability of their partner defecting is near zero.  
The most common paired behavior in both assigned treatments is for one player to 
punish and comply and for the other player to not punish and defect (PC, ND) or (ND, PC) 
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(Fig. 3). This supports the pure Nash equilibrium strategy where one player defects and 
there is an asymmetrical equilibrium, because it is the other player’s best response to not 
punish and comply. The frequency of this paired behavior compared to the next highest 
frequency (PC, NC), suggests that in assigned situations some people will cooperate and 
others will not, but that communication may persuade a non-punishing defector to comply; 
when communication is present in assigned groups, there is a 10% increase in (PC, NC) 
paired behavior and a 5% decrease in the (PC, ND) paired behavior as compared to no 
communication.  
The most common paired behavior in the self-assembled with no additional 
communication treatment is for one player to punish and comply and for one player not to 
punish and to comply (PC, NC) or (NC, PC), followed closely by one player punishing and 
complying and the other player punishing and defecting (PC, PD) or (PD, PC). When 
compared to the frequency of (NC, NC), this finding suggests the addition of 
communication may again persuade non-complying types to comply (Fig. 3).  
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Figure 3 Frequency of paired behavior by treatment. Note that duplicate strategies (i.e. (PC, ND) and 
(ND, PC)) are shown as one paired strategy. 
 
3.4 Individual strategies 
Players did not commonly play the strategy that would have maximized one’s payout 
for any of the treatments (Fig. 4). The most frequently played individual strategy differed 
greatly across the four treatments. Deviation from the rational behavior suggests treatment 
conditions influenced behavior, and comparing actual behavior to the theoretical predictions 
provides insight into the conditions that increase cooperation the most.    
The largest proportional deviations from rational behavior are in the self-assembled 
treatments where punish and comply was the most common strategy, where no punish and 
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defect had the highest payout (Fig. 4). This result suggests self-assembly inspires 
conservation behaviors. 
The highest payout for the assigned with no communication treatment comes from 
playing punish and defect, but individuals most frequently chose not to punish and were 
almost as likely to punish and comply as they were to punish and defect (Fig. 4). The 
highest payout for the assigned with communication treatment comes from playing no 
punish and defect, but individuals most frequently did not punish and complied (Fig. 4).  
 
Figure 4 Comparison between the frequency of each strategy played by treatment against how the 
payoff relative to other strategies in the treatment given the other strategies players will play. (i.e. the payout 
calculated considering both player’s strategy). PC = Punish and Comply, NC = No punish and Comply, PD = 
Punish and Defect, NP = No punish and Defect. 
4. Discussion 
We investigated two important cooperation behaviors that are particularly relevant 
for successful natural resource management – compliance and punishment. In almost all 
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cases of resource management, individuals are required to comply with prescribed 
regulations. Some management regimes rely on professional enforcement and punishment, 
while others rely on self-enforcement and punishment. Cooperative behaviors can also be 
synergistic in different ways – e.g., those who participate in one cooperative behavior are 
more likely to engage in the other cooperative behaviors, and enforcement and punishment 
can result in compliance (Fehr and Gächter 2002). However, the cause and effect nature of 
these relationships likely depends on how effective enforcement is and how credible the 
punishment is (McGillivray and Smith 2006, Horai and Tedeschi 1969). Therefore, the local 
context together with management decisions likely determine which aspects of cooperation 
behaviors are most relevant and feasible.  
 
4.1 Management benefits of self-determination 
We predicted that both self-assembly and face-to-face communication would 
increase cooperation. However, we find that only self-assembly significantly increases 
cooperation. Communication has a positive but not significant effect on cooperation. One 
possible explanation may be that individuals in self-assembled groups have shared norms 
and can anticipate one another’s strategy before the game is played, making the additional 
communication only marginally beneficial. The larger impact of group assembly relative to 
communication was surprising given the large volume of literature that finds 
communication benefits cooperation (Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977, van de Kragt, 
Orbell and Dawes 1983, Balliet 2009, Ostrom et al. 1994, Messick and Brewer 1983, Sally 
1995, Brosig et al. 2003). It is commonly believed face-to-face communication increases a 
sense of accountability and makes the threat of punishment more credible (or less cheap), 
  
 
 107 
thereby incentivizing players not to defect (Brosig et al. 2003). It is unlikely, but possible, 
that participants were able to cheat the no communication rule in our experiment. For 
example, there could have been subtle body language or comments made that the facilitators 
did not pick up on. It was also possible that we did not allow our participants long enough to 
communicate face-to-face, or that the benefits of communication may have been absorbed in 
the self-assembly process making additional communication non-significant. However, this 
implies that communication is more important in assigned groups, which our results neither 
support or rule out. Recently and post field work, our local colleagues in Tañon Strait are 
investing more time and energy into strategies building social trust in addition to face-to-
face communication, because they believe the benefits of face-to-face communication are 
not enough to inspire cooperation. 
The finding that self-assembled two-person groups cooperate significantly better 
than assigned two-person groups may or may not be generalizable to the real world where 
group size will typically be much larger. Whether the benefits of self assembly extend to far 
larger groups warrants further investigation. Laboratory experiments suggest agency in 
group formation will increase contributions to group benefits (Isaac and Walker 1988, 
Charness and Yang 2014), but this has not been investigated in the field. If larger self-
assembled groups do indeed cooperate more than their assigned counterparts, it is in a 
resource manager’s best interest to allow people to self assemble into groups that manage a 
common pool resource, like fisheries. Our findings offer evidence in support of efforts to 
increase self-determination in political processes (Agarwal 2009, Ostrom 2011), including 
catch share systems like TURFs.   
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4.2 Future directions 
Further research is needed to understand the management decisions fostering group 
dynamics that can help facilitate larger cooperatives (like a TURF) or even networks of 
cooperatives. In our behavioral experiment we framed group assembly as either self-
assembled or assigned. However, there are many instances where an imposed group may not 
have the same performance cost as being completely “random,” because people know each 
other well and there may be higher levels of trust than predicted by random assemblies. We 
looked at communication, but it is likely that there may be other social, political and 
economic characteristics that help mitigate the shortcomings of exogenously assembled 
groups. For example, there may be management strategies for building rapport that do not 
involve face-to-face communication, such as transparent harvest reporting and decision-
making processes. Further behavioral experiments may investigate how these characteristics 
and alternative strategies influence conservation behaviors.  
Resource management has a lot to gain from integrating social science (Bennett et al. 
2017, Hicks and Cinner 2016, Karieva and Mavier 2012, Mascia 2003). For example, TURF 
design elements primarily focus on fish ecology (e.g. species mobility – White and Costello 
2011) or geography (e.g. physical barriers – Bonzon et al. 2013), whereas the social side of 
TURF design has received far less attention by comparison. Successful resource 
management plans almost always require individuals to comply, and in most small- scale 
fisheries, to self-enforce and to punish defectors. Therefore, managers will benefit by 
applying experimental approaches like ours to consider the social dimensions and 
management actions that influence conservation outcomes.  
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5. Conclusion 
We demonstrate that the presence of choice in one’s community increases 
cooperation, and that communication alone cannot be counted on to counter these reductions 
in cooperation. Our findings are significant for behavioral scientists and natural resource 
managers alike and are in line with the trend towards co-management practices that 
encourage self-assembly and locally determined rules of engagement. 
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Supplemental Material 
1.  Precautions 
We needed to ensure we knew who fully understood the game and who did not. All 
experiment instruction was presented orally and visually and included a set of examples and 
possible actions and outcomes. Before play began, players were asked a series of 
hypothetical pay out questions to ensure they understood the nature of the game and the 
correct answers were discussed by the facilitators. The facilitators played a mock game for 
demonstration and then the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game was played. 
 
2. Solved mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and Utility  
Let σ = probability of playing a particular strategy, σPC = probability of playing punish and 
comply, σNC = probability of playing no punish and comply, σPD = probability of playing 
punish and defect, and σND = probability of playing no punish and defect. The sum of all the 
probabilities of each of the Player’s four strategies must equal 1: σPC + σNC + σPD +  σND = 1.  
 
Let an arbitrary player be called player i. Let Si denote the set of strategies available to 
player i, and let si denote an arbitrary member of this set. Let (sPC, sNC, sPD, sND) denote the 
combination of strategies for each player, and let E1 denote player i’s payoff function: 
Ei(sPC, sNC, sPD, sND) is the payoff to player i if the players choose the strategies (sPC, sNC, sPD, 
sND). Collecting all this together, we denote the game by G = {sPC, sNC, sPD, sND ; EPC, ENC, EPD, 
END}. From above, we know that the mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution 
σi = σiPC + σiNC + σiPD + σiND where σi= 1. If Player 1 plays punish and comply (PC), then 
Player 1’s expected payoff is a function of σ2: 
EU1(Punish + Comply) =  6(σ2PC+ σ2NC) + 0 + 0      
EU1(No Punish + Comply) = 6(σ2PC+ σ2NC) + 1(σ2PD+ σ2ND) 
EU1(Punish + Defect) = 5σ2PC+ 10σ2NC - 4σ2PD+ 1σ2ND 
EU1(No Punish + Defect) = 5σ2PC+ 10σ2NC - 3σ2PD+ 2σ2ND 
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Random + No 
Communication 
Random + 
Communication Self Assembled 
Self Assembled + 
Communication 
PC 0.1118 0.2685 0.3958 0.5000 
NC 0.3602 0.3758 0.3819 0.3500 
PD 0.1615 0.1477 0.1181 0.0929 
ND 0.3665 0.2081 0.1042 0.0571 
SM Table 1 Frequency of each strategy per treatment.  
 
 
Random + No 
Communication 
Random + 
Communication Self Assembled 
Self Assembled + 
Communication 
PC 3.00 3.87 4.67 5.10 
NC 3.36 4.22 4.89 5.25 
PD 3.88 4.72 5.43 5.69 
ND 2.42 5.07 5.65 5.84 
SM Table 2 Expected payout solved by replacing theoretical probabilities in the utility function for each 
strategy with actual game values. 
 
Now consider the pure Nash equilibrium from before given that each strategy has a 
probability assigned to it. Consider the paired strategy (PC, PC). This equilibrium only 
holds for σ2NC = 0, and σ2NC = 0, thus if there is any probability that Player 2 will not comply 
(i.e. for σ2NC > 0, and σ2NC > 0) then the paired strategy (PC, PC) is no longer at equilibrium. 
Therefore, if the probability of one player defecting is greater than zero, it is the other 
player’s best response not to punish. 
 
Player 1 punishes with the probability σ1P and complies with the probability σ1C, and does 
not punish with the probability 1- σ1P and defects with the probability 1- σ1C. Likewise, 
Player 2 has the same probabilities: σ2 = σ2P + σ2C + (1- σ2P) + (1- σ2C). We want to know 
what should Player 1’s probability of complying (σ1C) and probability of punishing (σ1P) be 
to maximize his strategy given a particular strategy of Player 2 (e.g. What is his best 
response function?).  
 
Player 1’s expected utility to Player 2’s profile of mixed strategies (S) is: 
E[u1(S)] = σ 1C [σ
 1
P(6σ
 2
C σ
 2
P + 6σ
 2
C (1- σ
 2
P) + 0 + 0 + 
 
(1- σ 1P)(6σ
 2
C σ
 2
P  + 6 σ
 2
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 2
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 2
C)(σ
 2
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Given Player 2’s mixed strategy, if Player 1 plays the pure strategy punish and comply 
(PC), Player 1’s payoff may be written: 
E1(PC)  = 6σ2Cσ2P + 6σ2C (1- σ2P) + 0 + 0 
= 6σ2Cσ2P + 6σ2C - 6σ2P 
 
Likewise, if Player 1 plays no punish and comply (NC), Player 1’s payoff is   
E1(NC)  = 6σ2C σ2P + 6σ2C(1- σ2P) + (1- σ2C)(σ2P) + (1- σ2C)(1- σ2P) 
= 6σ2Cσ2P + 5σ2C - 6σ2P + 1 
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If Player 1 plays punish and defect (PD), Player 1’s payoff is 
E1(PD)  = 5σ2C σ2P + 10σ2C(1- σ2P) – 4(1- σ2C)σ2P + (1- σ2C)(1- σ2P) 
=9 σ2C – 5σ2P + 1 
 
And if Player 1 plays no punish and defect (ND), Player 1’s payoff is  
E1(ND)  = 5σ2C σ2P + 10σ2C (1- σ2P) – 3(1- σ2C) σ2P+ 2(1- σ2C)(1-σ2P) 
= 8σ2C– 5σ2P + 2 
 
Player 1 will mix between the four strategies if the expected payouts are the same:  
E1(PC) = E1(NC) = E1(PD) = E1(ND) 
 
Substituting in our utility values, we get:  
6σ2Cσ2P + 6σ2C - 6σ2P  = 6σ2Cσ2P + 5σ2C - 6σ2P + 1 = 9σ2C – 5σ2P + 1 = 8σ2C– 5σ2P + 2 
 
Which, upon simplification, yields σ2C = 1 and σ2P =4/5. Solving σ2C = 1 and σ2P =4/5 allows 
us to then solve σ2D = 0 and σ2N =1/5, which is shown in Table 1.  
 
 
3. Possible paired strategy payoffs  
 
SM Figure 1. Possible payoffs for Player 1 and Player 2 give the opportunity to punish, or not punish, and 
comply or defect. 
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SM Figure 2 Output from bimatrix algorithm (Avis et al. 2010).  
 
4. Results filtering out participants who did not show full understanding.  
Compliance Punishment 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr (>|t|) Estimate 
Std. 
Error t value Pr (>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.541 0.053 10.205 0.000 0.254 0.060 4.224 0.000 
Assembly 0.236 0.061 3.886 0.000 0.231 0.092 2.502 0.012 
Communication 0.072 0.061 1.139 0.255 0.148 0.090 1.641 0.101 
SM Table 3 Results from analysis filtering out participants who did not show full 
understanding. 
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IV. Conclusion  
 
In response to growing threats to global fisheries, fisheries managers recognize the 
importance of integrating human dimensions with natural science (Mascia et al. 2003, 
Kareiva and Marvier 2012, Kittinger et al. 2014). However, there remains a knowledge and 
disciplinary gap preventing human dimensions from being successfully incorporated into 
management practices (Mascia 2003, Lundquist and Granek 2005, Bennett et al. 2017a,b). 
This dissertation seeks to remedy this by dig deeper into social science disciplines to find 
specific tools to guide in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of marine 
governance.   
Building from Bennett et al. and others’ (Mascia 2003, Lundquist and Granek 2005, 
Kareiva and Marvier 2012, Hicks and Cinner 2015) compelling cases for mainstreaming 
social science into marine conservation, this dissertation shows how marine governance can 
use interdisciplinary techniques that combine behavioral experiments and surveys to 
increase stakeholder cooperation and management success. This dissertation demonstrates 
how decision-makers can rapidly gain critical information needed for the design, 
implementation and management of marine resources and how insight gained from such an 
approach can efficiently address specific social challenges facing natural resources 
managers. 
The first part of this dissertation advances how social equity is considered and 
integrated into marine conservation. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical foundation for defining 
social equity and considering its role in conservation outcomes. It distinguishes between 
different types of equity and introduces the equity landscape as a way to describe the 
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distributions of resources and participation rights in a society supported by social norms in a 
given community. A society’s equity landscape will influence stakeholder behaviors and 
what types of management are implementable, as well as short- and long-term conservation 
outcomes. Chapter 1 motivates empirically testing how different types of equity are 
experienced in a community and how these different types of equity influence stakeholder 
behavior.  
Chapter 2 builds from concepts presented in Chapter 1 to empirically investigate 
how different types of equity are experienced in one community and how these different 
types of equity influence stakeholder behaviors (compliance with social norms and 
willingness to punish defectors). The results from this work inform decisions on critical 
design elements, such as should the intervention focus on participation, or outcomes of the 
intervention, such as access or financial benefits? Should equity objectives be equal or fair? 
And, how should managers measure these objectives?  
The second part of this dissertation leverages advances in the field of collective 
action to investigate real world management decisions. Chapter 3 uses a behavioral 
experiment to investigate 1) how does the process of group formation affect the 
performance of natural resource management? and, 2) does promoting face-to-face 
communication among group members can offset some of these costs associated less 
agency?  This research shows that self-assembly and the ability to communicate face-to-face 
both increase compliance with rules and punishment of defectors, although self-assembly 
has a greater effect.  
Most problems in natural resource management are rooted in some sort of social 
dilemma, and the collective action literature contains a wealth of knowledge on how diverse 
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types of societies can solve these problems. While this work is specific to artisanal fishing 
communities in Tañon Strait, Philippines, it provides an approach to solving a range of 
social problems that may have huge impacts on conservation outcomes. Ultimately, 
conservation outcomes are determined by people, which requires people be a part of the 
solution.  
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V. Appendix 
This Appendix contains more information about the field work conducted in the Philippines.  
Random assignment 
Upon arrival participants were randomly assigned a number, which was how they were 
identified and kept anonymous. Each participant was given a player packet (envelope) with 
a welcome letter, their assigned round, written instructions for the prisoner’s dilemma game, 
a “willingness to punish” card, paper cards for anonymously reporting their harvest, and two 
surveys.  
 
Recruitment tool to local mayor 
Dear Mayor, 
Rare and the University of California Santa Barbara invite you and your community 
to Alegria to participate in experimental games on November 17th, 2016. These games are 
designed to learn about how fishers cooperate, and will help design better management 
strategies. Your participation is very important and valued!  
This is a full day event. Food and transportation will be provided. Participants have 
the opportunity to earn a full day’s wage.  
Please be in contact with Roxanee Jul Lumactud-Tandang regarding your attendance.  
Many thanks, 
UCSB & Rare collaborators  
  
Player Packet 
Welcome letter 
Dear Participant,  
Thank you for joining us today. This is a joint project between the University of 
California Santa Barbara and Rare. We are very excited to be here.  
You will be playing two games that will help us inform future fisheries management.  
You will be paid PhP500 and have the opportunity to make an additional 45 – 450 Pesos. 
How you play the games will determine how much money you make. The rules of the game 
will be explained to you before you play each game.  
Below you will find an itinerary of the day’s events. Your packet tells you which 
groups are in. We are on a tight schedule, so please be ready when your group is called.  
Your player packet also has several other papers in it. We will tell you when to pull 
out each paper – please do not look at these papers before it is time. After you play each 
game, please complete the survey in your player packet, and put it back inside the envelope. 
Please return your envelope to us before you leave. You will receive your final payout 
before you leave.  
Please note that all information will be kept completely confidential – your name is 
not recorded anywhere in the documents we keep. We do not foresee any risks or 
discomforts but if you have any concerns or questions, please feel free to ask us now, or 
contact Rare later.  
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Punishment card 
If your partner choses to not cooperate by choosing 10 fish, you can punish them by taking 
away 5 of their fish (they will be left with 5 fish) but it will cost you 1 fish. Would you like 
to punish them?    
Yes / No 
 
Game 1 Instructions and Game cards 
Instructions 
*Prior to play, fill out the Punishment Card and return in back into your player packet. 
1. Both you and your partner can harvest either 6 or 10 fish from a pond.  
2. If you both harvest 6 fish, than you both get to keep 6 fish.  
3. If you both harvest 10 fish, than you both get to keep 2 fish.   
4. If one of you harvests 10 fish and one you harvests 6 fish, the person who harvested 10 
fish gets to keep those 10 fish, and the person who harvested 6 fish only gets 1 fish.  
5. You are not allowed to communicate unless told so by the facilitator.  
6. You will play 3 different rounds with 3 different partners. 
(Treatments A & B: Partners are randomly assigned to you) 
(Treatments C & D: You are allowed to select your partner) 
7. Individual harvest is never announced and kept private.  
8. For each round, you will circle how many fish you chose to harvest on the scorecard 
with the correct round number (1, 2 or 3). 
9. Rip off the scorecard, and place it face down with your partner’s scorecard. 
10. The facilitator will staple them together and collect them.  
11. You will not know the results of each round. 
12. We will randomly pick one of the rounds to calculate the payouts. 
 
Game cards 
    
1                                   # 
 
6    or    10 
   
 2                               # 
 
6    or    10 
    
3                                   # 
 
6    or    10 
 
 
Treatment A: 54 
Treatment B: 55 
Treatment C: 51 
Treatment D: 50 
 
Survey 1- completed post game play.  
1. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely fair, and 5 being completely NOT fair), how fair 
did you think the rules of the game were?  
1            2           3           4           5 
2. How many fish do you get to keep if you harvest 6 fish and your partner harvests 10 
fish?  
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o 1 fish 
o 2 fish 
o 6 fish 
o 10 fish 
3. How many fish do you get if both you and your partner harvest 10 fish?  
o 1 fish 
o 2 fish 
o 6 fish 
o 10 fish 
4. One a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely trustworthy, and 5 being completely 
untrustworthy), how trustworthy did you think your partner in the first round was? 
1            2           3           4           5 
5. One a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely trustworthy, and 5 being completely 
untrustworthy), how trustworthy did you think your partner in the second round was? 
1            2           3           4           5 
6. One a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely trustworthy, and 5 being completely 
untrustworthy), how trustworthy did you think your partner in the third round was?    
1            2           3           4           5 
7. (Treatments A & B) How do you feel about being randomly paired with partners? 
(Treatments C & D) How/why did you chose your partners? 
8. Why did you harvest the number of fish that you did? 
9. Which municipality do you live in?  
10. How old are you? 
11. Are you male or female?  
12. How many dependents do you have?  
13. How much of your income depends on marine resources?      
All  /  Some / A little  
14. How much of your subsistence (food) depends on marine resources?    
All  /  Some / A little 
15. In a typical week during the high season, how much money do you make?  
16. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely equal, and 5 being completely NOT equal), how 
equally do you think the benefits from marine resources are spread throughout your 
community? 
1            2           3           4           5 
17. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely fair, and 5 being completely NOT fair), how fair 
do you think overall benefits associated with marine resources are in your community?  
1            2           3           4           5 
18. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely fair, and 5 being completely NOT fair, how fair 
do you think access is to marine resources in your community?  
1            2           3           4           5 
19. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely fair, and 5 being completely NOT fair), how fair 
do you think financial benefits are distributed in your community? 
1            2           3           4           5 
20. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely fair, and 5 being completely NOT fair), how fair 
do you think participation in fisheries management is in your community?   
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1            2           3           4           5 
 
Survey 2 – conducted several hours after game play and Survey 1.   
1. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being high, and 5 low), what is your overall well-being?  
1            2           3           4           5 
2. On a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely fair and 5 being completely unfair), how fair do 
you think marine resources are managed in your community?   
1            2           3           4           5 
3. How does your access to marine resources compare to others’ access to marine resources?  
I have a lot more access than others / I have more access than others /  
I have the same access as others / I have less access than others /  
I have a lot less access than others / Unsure 
4. How do you feel you benefit financially from fisheries compared to others in your 
community? 
I benefited a lot more than others / I benefited more than others /  
I neither benefited or am harmed more than others / I am harmed more than others / I am 
harmed a lot more than others / Unsure 
5. How does your participation in fisheries management activities compare to others’ 
participation in fisheries management activities?  
I participate a lot more than others / I participate more than others /  
I participate the same as others / I participate less than others /  
I participate a lot less than others / Unsure 
6. One a scale of 1 – 5 (1 being completely untrustworthy, and 5 being completely 
trustworthy), how trustworthy do you think your community is, meaning people will 
comply with rules? 
1            2           3           4           5 
7. Are you also a seaweed (or fish) farmer? Yes /  No 
8. If so, how many hours per week do you spend on each activity (fishing and farming) on 
average?  
Hours a week spent fishing: _________    
Hours a week spent farming: _________ 
9.  Would you give up fishing entirely if you could make more money farming? 
  Yes/No 
 
 
